dinsdag, oktober 31, 2006

HEWLER

Kürdistan Bölge Parlamentosu Başkan yardımcısı Kemal Kerküki, Kerkük’ün ‘kırmızı çizgileri’ olduğunu söyleyerek, Türk devletinin ne yakından ne de uzaktan Kerkük ile hiçbir bağı olmadığını söyledi. Kerküki, “Türkiye, elini Kerkük’e uzatamaz’’ dedi. Kemal Kerküki, Nefel internet sitesine verdiği özel demeçte, Türkiye’nin, Kerkük meselesi kendileri için ‘’ciddi bir mesele ve kırmızı çizgileri’ olduğunu belirterek, Türk devletinin ne yakından ne de uzaktan Kerkük ile hiçbir bağı olmadığını kaydetti. Kerküki; “Türkiye, elini Kerkük’e uzatamaz. Eğer zorla uzatsa bile, tüm Irak’a uzatmış olur ki bunu da hiç kimse kabul etmez” sözleri ile Türkiye devletini uyardı. Kerküki, “Kerkük, tarihi ve coğrafi olarak Kürdistan’ın bir parçasıdır. Kerkük’ün Kürdistani bir kent olduğunu kanıtlayan büyük Britanya ve Osmanlı imparatorluğu dönemine ait çok eski belge ve doküman mevcuttur” dedi. ‘KÜRTLER KANUN YOLUNU SEÇTİ’ ‘’Irak’ta artık zülüm ve diktatörlük sisteminin kalmadığını’’ belirten Kemal Kerküki, “Hakları elinden alınanların haklarının geri verilmesi’’ gerektiğinin altını çizdi. ‘’Kürdistan’ın federe olmasının, ‘’Kürdistan’ın bağımsızlığı’’ anlamına geldiğini söyleyen Kerküki, ‘’Kürdistan, bugün federal Irak’ın bütünlüğü içinde yer alıyor’’ diye konuştu. Kerkük kentinin Kürdistan bölgesine dahil edilmesi konusunda Kürtlerin önünde, ‘savaş ve kanun’ gibi iki yol olduğunu dile getiren Kemal Kerküki; “ Kürdistan siyasi liderliğinin kanun yolunu tercih ettiğini” söyledi. Aynı zamanda Kürdistan Parlamentosu tarafından oluşturulan 140. Maddeyi İzleme Komisyonu Başkanı olan Kerküki şunları kaydetti: ‘’Irak Daimi Anayasası’nın 140.maddesine göre, Kerkük sorunu 2007 yılının sonunda çözüme kavuşması gerekiyor. Kerkük halkı da, Kürdistan bölgesi ya da Bağdat ile kalmak istediği konusunda son kararını verecektir. 29 Mart 2007’ye kadar, diktatör Baas rejimi tarafından demografik yapısı değiştirilen Kerkük’ün durumu normalleştirilmesi gerekiyor. Buna göre; Kerkük’ten koparılan Çemçemal, Kifri, Kelar, Tuz ve diğer ilçe ve kasabaların yeniden Kerkük’e bağlanması, Baas rejiminin zorla göçerttiği Kürt, Türkmen, Asuri ve Ermeni ailelerinin dönüşünün sağlanması, Baas rejiminin bölgeye yerleştirdiği yabancı Arapların da eski yerine dönüşünün sağlanması gerekiyor.” TÜRKMEN CEPHESİ KARGAŞA YARATMAK İSTİYOR Kerküki, Irak Türkmen Cephesi içinde küçük bir grubun Kerkük’ün Kürdistan bölgesine dahil olmasına karşı çıktığını ve Kerkük’te kargaşa ortamı yaratmanın çabası içinde olduklarına dikkat çekerek, “Bu grup Türkmenlerin çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmiyorlar. Kerkük halkının çoğunluğu, Kerkük’ün Kürdistan bölgesine bağlanması görüşünü savunuyor” dedi.

Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

AN INCOVENIENT PATRIOT

By David Rose
Love of country led Sibel Edmonds to become a translator for the F.B.I. following 9/11. But everything changed when she accused a colleague of covering up illicit activity involving Turkish nationals. Fired after sounding the alarm, she's now fighting for the ideals that made her an American, and threatening some very powerful people.
In Washington, D.C., and its suburbs, December 2, 2001 was fine but cool, the start of the slide into winter after a spell of unseasonable warmth. At 10 o'clock that morning, Sibel and Matthew Edmonds were still in their pajamas, sipping coffee in the kitchen of their waterfront town house in Alexandria, Virginia, and looking forward to a well-deserved lazy Sunday.
Since mid-September, nine days after the 9/11 attacks, Sibel had been exploiting her fluency in Turkish, Farsi, and Azerbaijani as a translator at the F.B.I. It was arduous, demanding work, and Edmonds--who had two bachelor's degrees, was about to begin studying for her master's, and had plans for a doctorate--could have been considered overqualified. But as a naturalized Turkish-American, she saw the job as her patriotic duty.
The Edmondses' thoughts were turning to brunch when Matthew answered the telephone. The caller was a woman he barely knew--Melek Can Dickerson, who worked with Sibel at the F.B.I. "I'm in the area with my husband and I'd love you to meet him," Dickerson said. "Is it O.K. if we come by?" Taken by surprise, Sibel and Matthew hurried to shower and dress. Their guests arrived 30 minutes later. Matthew, a big man with a fuzz of gray beard, who at 60 was nearly twice the age of his petite, vivacious wife, showed them into the kitchen. They sat at a round, faux-marble table while Sibel brewed tea.
Melek's husband, Douglas, a U.S. Air Force major who had spent several years as a military attaché in the Turkish capital of Ankara, did most of the talking, Matthew recalls. "He was pretty outspoken, pretty outgoing about meeting his wife in Turkey, and about his job. He was in weapons procurement." Like Matthew, he was older than his wife, who had been born about a year before Sibel.
According to Sibel, Douglas asked if she and Matthew were involved with the local Turkish community, and whether they were members of two of its organized groups--the American-Turkish Council (A.T.C.) and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (A.T.A.A.). "He said the A.T.C. was a good organization to belong to," Matthew says. "It could help to ensure that we could retire early and live well, which was just what he and his wife planned to do. I said I was aware of the organization, but I thought you had to be in a relevant business in order to join.
"Then he pointed at Sibel and said, `All you have to do is tell them who you work for and what you do and you will get in very quickly.'" Matthew could see that his wife was far from comfortable: "She tried to change the conversation to the weather and such-like." But the Dickersons, says Matthew, steered it back to what they called their "network of high-level friends." Some, they said, worked at the Turkish Embassy in Washington. "They said they even went shopping weekly for [one of them] at a Mediterranean market," Matthew says. "They used to take him special Turkish bread."
Before long, the Dickersons left. At the time, Matthew says, he found it "a strange conversation for the first time you meet a couple. Why would someone I'd never met say such things?"
Only Sibel knew just how strange. A large part of her work at the F.B.I. involved listening to the wiretapped conversations of people who were the targets of counter-intelligence investigations. As she would later tell investigators from the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General (O.I.G.) and the U.S. Congress, some of those targets were Turkish officials the Dickersons had described as high-level friends. In Sibel's view, the Dickersons had asked the Edmondses to befriend F.B.I. suspects. (In August 2002, Melek Can Dickerson called Sibel's allegations "preposterous, ludicrous and slanderous.")
Sibel also recalled hearing wiretaps indicating that Turkish Embassy targets frequently spoke to staff members at the A.T.C., one of the organizations that Turkish Embassy targets frequently spoke to staff members at the A.T.C., one of the organizations that the Dickersons allegedly wanted her and her husband to join. Sibel later told the O.I.G. she assumed that the A.T.C.'s board--which is chaired by Brent Scowcroft, President George H. W. Bush's national-security advisor--knew nothing of the use to which it was being put. But the wiretaps suggested to her that the Washington office of the A.T.C. was being used as a front for criminal activity.
Sibel and Matthew stood at the window of their oak-paneled hallway and watched the Dickersons leave. Sibel's Sunday has been ruined.
Immediately and in the weeks that followed, Sibel Edmonds tried to persuade her bosses to investigate the Dickersons. There was more to her suspicions than their peculiar Sunday visit. According to the documents filed by Edmonds's lawyers, Sibel believed Melek Can Dickerson had leaked information to one or more targets of an F.B.I. investigation, and had tried to prevent Edmonds from listening to wiretaps of F.B.I. targets herself. But instead of carrying out a thorough investigation of her allegations, at the end of March 2002 the F.B.I. fired Edmonds.
Edmonds is not the first avowed national security whistle-blower to suffer retaliation at the hands of a government bureaucracy that feels threatened or embarrassed. But being fired is one thing. Edmonds has also been prevented from proceeding with her court challenge or even speaking with complete freedom about the case.
On top of the usual prohibition against disclosing classified information, the Bush administration has smothered her case beneath the all-encompassing blanket of the "state-secrets privilege"--a Draconian and rarely used legal weapon that allows the government, merely by asserting a risk to national security, to prevent the lawsuits Edmonds has filed contesting her treatment from being heard in court at all. According to the Department of Justice, to allow Edmonds her day in court, even at a closed hearing attended only by personnel with full security clearance, "could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the foreign policy and national security of the United States."
Using the state-secrets privilege in this fashion is unusual, says Edmonds's attorney Ann Beeson, of the American Civil Liberties Union. "It also begs the question: Just what in the world is the government trying to hide?"
It may be more than another embarrassing security scandal. One counter-intelligence official familiar with Edmonds's case has told Vanity Fair that the F.B.I. opened an investigation into covert activities by Turkish nationals in the late 1990's. That inquiry found evidence, mainly via wiretaps, of attempts to corrupt senior American politicians in at least two major cities--Washington and Chicago. Toward the end of 2001, Edmonds was asked to translate some of the thousands of calls that had been recorded by this operation, some dating back to 1997.
Edmonds has given confidential testimony inside a secure Sensitive Compartmented Information facility on several occasions: to congressional staffers, to investigators from the O.I.G., and to the staff from the 9/11 commission. Sources familiar with this testimony say that, in addition to her allegations about the Dickersons, she reported hearing Turkish wiretap targets boast that they had a covert relationship with a very senior politician indeed--Dennis Hastert, Republican congressman from Illinois and Speaker of the House since 1999. The targets reportedly discussed giving Hastert tens of thousands of dollars in surreptitious payments in exchange for political favors and information. "The Dickersons," says one official familiar with the case, "are only the tip of the iceberg."
It's safe to say that Edmonds inherited her fearless obstinacy from her father, Rasim Deniz, who died in 2000. Born in the Tabriz region of northwestern Iran, many of whose natives speak Farsi (Persian), Turkish, and Azerbaijani, he was one of the Middle East's leading reconstructive surgeons, but his forthright liberal and secular opinions brought him into a series of conflicts with the local regimes. One of Sibel's earliest memories is of a search of her family's house in Tehran by members of SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, who were looking for left-wing books. Later, in 1981, came a terrifying evening after the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamist revolution, when Sibel was 11. She was waiting in the car while her father went into a restaurant for takeout. By the time Deniz returned, his vehicle had been boxed in by government S.U.V.'s and Sibel was surrounded by black-clad revolutionary guards, who announced they were taking her to jail because her headscarf was insufficiently modest.
"My father showed his ID and asked them, `Do you know who I am?,'" Sibel says. "He had been doing pro bono work in the slums of south Tehran for years, and now it was the height of the Iran-Iraq war. He told them, `I have treated so many of your brothers. If you take my daughter, next time I have one in my operating room who needs an amputation at the wrist, I will cut his arm off at the shoulder.' They let me go."
It was time to get out. As soon as he could, Deniz abandoned his property and his post as head of the burn center at one of Tehran's most prestigious hospitals, and the family fled to Turkey.
When Sibel was 17, she wrote a paper for a high-school competition. Her chosen subject was Turkey's censorship laws, and why it was wrong to ban books and jail dissident writers. Her principal was outraged, she says, and asked her father to get her to write something else. Denis refused, but the incident caused a family crisis. "My uncle was mayor of Istanbul, and suddenly my essay was being discussed in an emergency meeting of the whole Deniz tribe. My dad was the only one who supported what I'd done. That was the last straw for me. I decided to take a break and go to the United States. I came here and fell in love with a lot of things--freedom. Now I wonder: was it just an illusion?"
Sibel enrolled at a college in Maryland, where she studied English and hotel management; later, she received bachelor's degrees at George Washington University in criminal justice and psychology, and worked with juvenile offenders. In 1992, at age 22, she had married Matthew Edmonds, a divorced retail-technology consultant who had lived in Virginia all his life.
For a long time, they lived an idyllic, carefree life. They bought their house in Alexandria, and Sibel transformed it into an airy spacious haven, with marble floors, a library, and breathtaking views across the Potomac River to Washington. Matthew had always wanted to visit Russia, and at Sibel's suggestion they spent three months in St. Petersburg, working with a children's hospital charity run by the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich. Sibel's family visited America often, and she and Matthew spent their summers at a cottage they had bought in Bodrum, Turkey, on the Aegean coast.
"People said we wouldn't last two years," Sibel says, "And here we still are, nearly 13 years on. A lot of people who go through the kind of experiences I've had find they put a huge strain on their marriage. Matthew is my rock. I couldn't have done it without him."
In 1978, when Sibel was eight and the Islamists' violent prelude to the Iranian revolution was just beginning, a bomb went off in a movie theater next to her elementary school. "I can remember sitting in the car, seeing the rescuers pulling charred bodies and stumps out of the fire. Then, on September 11, to see this thing happening here, across the ocean--it brought it all back. They put out a call for translators, and I thought, Maybe I can stop this from happening again."
The translation department Edmonds joined was housed in a huge, L-shaped room in the F.B.I.'s Washington field office. Some 200 to 300 translators sat in this vast, open space, listening with headphones to digitally recorded wiretaps. The job carried heavy responsibilities. "You are the front line," Edmonds says. "You are the filter fro every piece of intelligence which comes in foreign languages. It's down to you to decide what's important--`pertinent,' as the F.B.I. calls it, and what's not. You decide what requires verbatim translation, what can be summarized, and what should be marked `not pertinent' and left alone. By the time this material reaches the agents and analysts, you've already decided what they're going to get." To get this right requires a broad background of cultural and political knowledge: "If you're simply a linguist, you won't be able to discern these differences."
She was surprised to discover that until her arrival the F.B.I. had employed no Turkish-language specialists at all. In early October she was joined by a second Turkish translator, who had been hired despite his having failed language-proficiency tests. Several weeks later, a third Turkish speaker joined the department: Melek Can Dickerson. In her application for the job, she wrote that she had not previously worked in America. In fact, however, she had spent two years as an intern at an organization that figured in many of the wiretaps--the American-Turkish Council.
Much later, after Edmonds was fired, the F.B.I. gave briefings to the House and Senate. One source who was present says bureau officials admitted that Dickerson had concealed her history with the A.T.C., not only in writing but also when interviewed as part of her background security check. In addition, the officials conceded that Dickerson began a friendship at the A.T.C. with one of the F.B.I.'s targets. "They confirmed that when she was supposed to be listening to his calls," says one congressional source. "To me, that was like asking a friend of a mobster to listen to him ordering hits. She might have an allegiance problem. But they seemed not to get it...They blew off their friendship as `just a social thing.' They told us `They had been colleagues at work, after all.'"
Shortly after the house visit from the Dickersons, Sibel conveyed her version of the event to her supervisor, Mike Feghali--first orally and then in writing. The "supervisory language specialist" responsible for linguists working in several Middle Eastern languages, Feghali is a Lebanese-American who had previously been an F.B.I. Arabic translator for many years. Edmonds says he told her not to worry.
To monitor every call on every line at a large institution such as the Turkish Embassy in Washington would not be feasible. Inevitably, the F.B.I. listens more carefully to phones used by its targets, such as the Dickersons' purported friend. In the past, the assignment of lines to each translator has always been random: Edmonds might have found herself listening to a potentially significant conversation by a counter-intelligence target one minute and an innocuous discussion about some diplomatic party the next. Now, however, according to Edmonds, Dickerson suggested changing this system, so that each Turkish speaker would be permanently responsible for certain lines. She produced a list of names and numbers, together with her proposals for dividing them up. As Edmonds would later tell her F.B.I. bosses and congressional investigators, Dickerson had assigned the American-Turkish Council and three other "high-value" diplomatic targets, including her friend, to herself.
Edmonds found this arrangement very questionable. But she says that Dickerson spent a large part of that afternoon talking with Feghali inside his office. The next day he announced in an e-mail that he had decided to assign the Turkish wiretaps on exactly the basis recommended by Dickerson.
Like all his translators, Edmonds was effectively working with two, parallel lines of management: Feghali and the senior translation-department bosses above him, on one hand, and, on the other, the investigators and agents who actually used the material she translated. Early in the new year, 2002, Edmonds says, she discovered that Dennis Saccher, the F.B.I.'s special agent in charge of Turkish counter-intelligence, had developed his own, quite separate concerns about Dickerson.
On the morning of January 14, Sibel says, Saccher asked Edmonds to come into his cramped cubicle on the fifth floor. On his desk were printouts from the F.B.I. language-department database. They showed that on numerous occasions Dickerson had marked calls involving her friend and other counter-intelligence targets as "not pertinent," or had submitted only brief summaries stating that they contained nothing of interest. Some of these calls had a duration of more than 15 minutes. Saccher asked Edmonds why she was no longer working on these targets' conversations. She explained the new division of labor, and went on to tell him about the Dickersons' visit the previous month. Saccher was appalled, Edmonds says, telling her, "It sounds like espionage to me."
Saccher asked Edmonds and a colleague, Kevin Taskasen, to go back into the F.B.I.'s digital wiretap archive and listen to some of the calls that Dickerson had marked "not pertinent," and to re-translate as many as they could. Saccher suggested that they all meet with Feghali in a conference room on Friday, February 1. First, however, Edmonds and Taskasen should go to Saccher's office for a short pre-meeting--to review their findings and to discuss how to handle Feghali.
Edmonds had time to listen to numerous calls before the Friday meeting, and some of them sounded important. According to her later secure testimony, in one conversation, recorded shortly after Dickerson reserved the targets' calls for herself, a Turkish official spoke directly to a U.S. State Department staffer. They suggested that the State Department staffer would send a representative at an appointed time to the American-Turkish Council office, at 1111 14th St. NW, where he would be given $7,000 in cash. "She told us she'd heard mention of exchanges of information, dead drops--that kind of thing," a congressional source says. "It was mostly money in exchange for secrets." (A spokesperson for the A.T.C. denies that the organization has ever been involved in espionage or illegal payments. And a spokesperson for the Assembly of Turkish American Associations said that to suggest the group was involved with espionage or illegal payments is "ridiculous.")
Another call allegedly discussed a payment to a Pentagon official, who seemed to be involved in weapons-procurement negotiations. Yet another implied that Turkish groups had been installing doctoral students at U.S. research institutions in order to acquire information about black market nuclear weapons. In fact, much of what Edmonds reportedly heard seemed to concern not state espionage but criminal activity. There was talk, she told investigators, of laundering the profits of large-scale drug deals and of selling classified military technologies to the highest bidder.
Before entering the F.B.I. building for their Friday meeting with Saccher, Edmonds and Taskasen stood for a while on the sidewalk, smoking cigarettes. "Afterwards, we went directly to Saccher's office," Edmonds says. "We talked for a little while, and he said he'd see us downstairs for the meeting with Feghali a few minutes later, at nine A.M." They were barely out of the elevator when Feghali intercepted them. He didn't know they had just come from Saccher's office.
"Come on, we're going to start the meeting," he said. "By the way, Dennis Saccher can't be there, He's been sent out somewhere in the field." Later, Edmonds says, she called Saccher on the internal phone. "Why the hell did you cancel?" she asked. Bewildered, he told her that immediately after she and Taskasen had left his office Feghali phoned him, saying that the conference room was already in use, and that the meeting would have to be postponed.
Edmonds says Saccher also told her that he had been ordered not to touch the case by his own superiors, who called it a "can of worms." Despite his role as special agent in charge of Turkish counter-intelligence, he had even been forbidden to obtain copies of her translations. Saccher had two small children and a settled life in Washington. If he dared to complain, Edmonds says, he risked being assigned "to some fucked-up office in the land of tornadoes."
Instead, Edmonds was ushered into the windowless office of Feghali's colleague, translation-department supervisor Stephanie Bryan. Investigating possible espionage was not a task for which Bryan had been trained or equipped.
Bryan heard Edmonds out and told her to set down her allegations in a confidential memo. Edmonds says that Bryan approved of her writing it at home. Edmonds gave the document to Bryan on Monday, February 11. Early the following afternoon, the supervisor summoned Edmonds. Waiting in a nearby office were two other people, Feghali and Melek Can Dickerson. In front of them were Edmonds's translations of the wiretaps and her memo.
"Stephanie said that she'd taken my memo to the supervisory special agent, Tom Frields," Edmonds says. "He apparently wouldn't even look at it until Mike Feghali and Dickerson and seen it and been given a chance to comment. Stephanie said that, working for the government, there were certain things you didn't do, and criticizing your colleagues' work was one of them. She told me, `Do you realize what this means? If you were right, the people who did the background checks would have to be investigated. The whole translation department could be shaken up!' Meanwhile, I was going to be investigated for a possible security breach--for putting classified information on my home computer. I was told to go the security department at three P.M."
Before Edmonds left, Dickerson had time to sidle over to her desk. According to Edmonds, she made what sounded like a threat: "Why are you doing this, Sibel? Why don't you just drop it? You know there could be serious consequences. Why put your family in Turkey in danger over this?"
Edmonds says the F.B.I.'s response to her was beginning to shift from indifference to outright retaliation. On February 13, the day after her interview with the bureau security office, three agents came to her home and seized the computer she shared with her husband. "I hadn't had time to back up the data, and I told them that most of my business was on that computer, Matthew Edmonds says.
"An agent called the next morning," Matthew says. "He told me, `Everything on your computer is destroyed, and we didn't back it up.' They were playing games. When I got the computer back, they had wiped out everything. Four days later, I got a CD-ROM with it all backed up." A lifelong conservative Republican, Matthew was being shocked into changing his worldview. I was so naïve. I mean, what do you do if you think your colleague might be a spy? You go to the F.B.I.! I thought if Sibel's supervisor wasn't fixing this problem she should go to his superior, and so on up the chain. Someone would eventually fix it. I was never a cynical person. I am now."
While the agents were examining the Edmondses' computer, Mike Feghali was writing a memo for his own managers, stating "there was no basis" for Sibel's allegations. A day earlier, an F.B.I. security officer had interviewed Dickerson. A report issued by the O.I.G. in January 2005 states, "The Security Officer did not challenge the co-worker [Dickerson] with respect to any information the co-worker provided, although that information was not consistent with F.B.I. records. In addition...he did not review other crucial F.B.I. records, which would have supported some of Edmonds' allegations." Instead, he treated her claims as "performance issues," and "seemed not to appreciate or investigate the allegation that a co-worker may have been committing espionage.
According to a congressional source, the fact that Edmonds was a mere contract linguist, rather than an agent, made her claims less palatable. "They seemed to be saying, `We don't need someone like this making trouble,'" the source says. "Yet, to her credit, she really did go up through the chain of command: to her boss, his boss, and so on."
Edmonds reached the top of the language-section management on February 22, when she met with supervisory special agent Tom Frields, a gray-haired veteran who was approaching the end of a long bureau career. At first it seemed he was trying to set her mind at rest: "He told me, I just want to assure you that everything is fine, and as far as you're concerned, your work on this matter is done,'" Edmonds says. "I told him, `No, it's not fine. My family is worried about possible threats to their safety in Turkey.' His face went through a transformation. He warned me that these issues were classified at the highest level and must not be disclosed to anyone. He started to interrogate me: Who had I told? He said if it was anyone unauthorized he could have me arrested."
Edmonds's meeting with Frields on the 22nd was probably her last chance to save her job. The inspector general's 2005 report disclosed, "Immediately after the meeting, [Frields] began to explore whether the F.B.I. had the option to cease using Edmonds as a contract linguist."
Four days later the bureau's contracting unit told him, "If it was determined that [she] was unsuitable, the F.B.I. would have sufficient reason to terminate her contract." Stymied by Frields, Edmonds tried to go still higher, and on March 7 she was granted an audience with James Caruso, the F.B.I.'s deputy assistant director for counterterrorism and counter-intelligence. Edmonds says he listened politely for more than an hour but took no notes and asked no questions. Afterward, Matthew picked her up and they drove to the Capital Grille for an early lunch. It was only 11:30 and the restaurant was still empty, but as the Edmondses began to study their menus, they saw two men in suits pull up outside in an F.B.I.-issue S.U.V. They came inside and sat down at the next table.
"They just sat and stared at Sibel," Matthew says. "They took out their cell phones, opened them, and put them on the table. They didn't eat or drink--just sat, staring at Sibel, the whole time we were there." Modified cell phones, Sibel knew, are commonly used by bureau agents as a means of making covert recordings.
That afternoon, Sibel wrote to two official bodies with powers to investigate the F.B.I.--the Justice Department's internal affairs division, known as the Office of Professional Responsibility, and its independent watchdog, the O.IG. She went on to send faxes to the Senate Intelligence Committee and Senators Charles Grassley, Republican from Iowa, and Patrick Leahy, Democrat from Vermont, both of whom sit on the Senate Judiciary Committee, to say that she had found evidence of possible national-security breaches.
On March 8, Sibel appeared at a dingy little office in Washington's China Town, where she was polygraphed. According to the 2005 inspector general's report, the purpose of this examination was to discover whether she had made unauthorized disclosures of classified information. "She was not deceptive in her answers," the O.I.G. reported.
Dickerson was polygraphed two weeks later, on March 21, and she too was deemed to have passed. But, according to an official cited in the report, the questions she was asked were vague and unspecific. "The polygraph unit chief admitted that questions directly on point could have been asked but were not." Nevertheless, then and for a long time afterward, "the FBI continued to rely on the [Dickerson] polygraph as support for its position that Edmonds' allegations were unfounded."
Dickerson's polygraph test, however unsatisfactory, seems to have sealed Edmonds' fate at the FBI. The following afternoon, she was asked to wait in Stephanie Bryan's office. "Feghali saw me sitting there and leaned across the doorway," Edmonds says. "He tapped his watch and said, `In less than an hour you will be fired, you whore.'" A few minutes later, she was summoned to a meeting with Frields. They were joined by Bryan and George Stukenbroeker, the chief of personal security and the man in charge of investigating her case. Edmonds had violated every security rule in the book, Stukenbroeker said.
A hulking security guard arrived to help escort her from the building. Edmonds asked if she could return to her desk to retrieve some photos, including shots of her late father of which she had no copies. Bryan refused, saying, "You'll never set foot in the FBI again."
Bryan promised to forward them, says Edmonds, who never got the photos back. Edmonds looked at Frields. "You are only making your wrongdoing worse, and my case stronger. I will see you very soon," she told him. According to Edmonds, Frields replied, "Soon maybe, but it will be in jail. I'll see you in jail." (When interviewed by the O.I.G., Frields and another witness denied making this comment.)
Matthew was waiting outside. "I'm not a crybaby," Sibel says. "But as I got into my husband's car that afternoon, I was in floods, shaking.
As soon as she returned home from the February meeting where Dickerson allegedly cautioned her not to endanger her family in Turkey, Sibel called her mother and sister in Istanbul, even though it was the middle of the night there. Sibel is the oldest of three sisters. The youngest was studying in America and living with the Edmondses in Alexandria, but the middle sister - whose name Edmonds wishes to protect - was enjoying a successful career at an international travel company based in Istanbul. The 29-year-old was also engaged to be married. Within days of receiving Sibel's call, she flew with her mother to Washington.
Early in April, Sibel and Matthew were having lunch in their favorite Thai restaurant in Old Town Alexandria - a precious chance, with their house now fully occupied with Sibel's family, to share a private moment together. "My phone rang," Sibel says. "It was my middle sister. She said something really bad had happened and I must come back at once."
The sister's Istanbul neighbor had just phoned, saying that two policemen had knocked on her door, asking for the sister's whereabouts. They would not disclose the reason, saying only that it was an "intelligence matter." They also left a document. Sent by Tevfik Asici of the Atakoy Branch Police Station and dated April 11, it was addressed to Sibel's sister and read, "For an important issue your deposition/interrogation is required. If you do not report to the station within 5 days, between 09:00 and 17:00, as is required by Turkish law CMK.132, you will be taken/arrested by force."
In July 2002, with a written recommendation from Senator Grassley, Sibel's sister requested political asylum in the United States. Her application statement cited the threat allegedly made by Dickerson, adding that Sibel would be considered "a spy and a traitor to Turkey under Turkish law, and the Turkish police will use me to get at her. Turkish police are known for using cruelty and torture during interrogation; subjects are kept without advice to family members and often disappear with no trace." Estranged from Sibel, the sister remains in America, unable to go home.
Edmonds did what numerous avowed whistleblowers had done before: she appealed to congress, and she got a lawyer - David Colapinto of the Washington firm of Kohn, Kohn and Calapinto, which advertises itself on its Web site as specializing in cases of this kind. He filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act for full disclosure of what happened inside the bureau, and submitted a claim for damages for the violation of Edmonds's constitutional rights. By August he was ready to depose Douglas Can Dickerson. But before their scheduled deposition, the couple abruptly left the country. Douglas had been assigned to an air-force job in Belgium. Virgil Magee, a U.S. Air Force spokesman in Belgium, confirms that Dickerson remains on active duty in Europe, but refuses to say exactly where.
That fall, Attorney General John Ashcroft tried to wipe out Edmonds's legal action by invoking the state secrets privilege. This recourse, derived form English common law, has never been the subject of any congressional vote or statute. Normally, says Ann Beeson of the A.C.L.U., it is used be the government when it wants to resist the legal "discovery" in court of a specific piece of evidence that it fears might harm national security if publicized. But in Edmonds case Ashcroft argued that the very subject of her lawsuit was a state secret. To air her claims in front of federal judges would jeopardize national security.
This, Beeson says, had distinct advantages for the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice: it meant they did not have to contest the merits of her claims. Moreover, the substance of the arguments they used to justify this level of secrecy was and is secret itself. The full version of Ashcroft's declaration invoking the privilege, filed on October 18, 2002, was classified, and in the public case for blocking Edmonds's action rested on the mere assertion that it would be damaging to proceed. Later, in 2004, the law firm of Motley Rice sought to depose her for a pending case on behalf of the families of 9/11 victims. Immediately, Ashcroft asserted the privilege again. Motley Rice submitted a list of questions it wanted to ask Edmonds, almost all of which were prohibited. Among them: "When and where were you born?," "What languages do you speak?," and "Where did you go to school?"
Edmonds still wanted to fight, and to challenge Ashcroft in court. But over the next few months, the relationship with her lawyers began to suffer. "Let's face it, taking on the D.O.J. is no joke, especially in Washington," Edmonds says.
It was the absolute low point. I tried to find another firm," she says, "but as soon as I mentioned the state-secrets privilege, it was like, `Turn around, go back, and by the way the clock is running at $450 an hour.' I must have been turned away by 20 firms."
The Dickersons, the Justice Department, and the F.B.I. and its relevant personnel declined to comment for this article. In August 2002, Melek Can Dickerson told the Chicago Tribune, "both the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice have conducted separate investigations of [Edmonds's] claims.... They fired her and, interestingly, they continued my contract."
In September 2002, Colonel James Worth of the Office of the Air Force Inspector General said that, in response to a letter from Edmonds, there had been a "complete and thorough review of Major [Douglas] Dickerson's relationship with the American-Turkish Council" that found "no evidence of any deviation from the scope of his duties." Edmonds says she was not interviewed by those conducting the review.
Edmonds' treatment by the F.B.I. seems to fit two baleful patterns: the first is the bureau's refusal to address potentially disastrous internal-security flaws; the second is a general tendency among national-security agencies to retaliate against whistle-blowers.
Amid the lush greenery of his parents' garden in Plattsmouth, Nebraska; former F.B.I. senior intelligence-operations specialist John Cole describes how these institutional inclinations combined to destroy his career. Now 44, Cole joined the F.B.I. in 1985. By the late 1990's, he was running undercover operations in the Washington area, focusing on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. Later, while playing a key role in the 9/11 investigation, he became the F.B.I.'s national counter-intelligence program manager for India, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Early in the fall of 2001, Cole was asked to assess whether a woman who had applied to work as a translator of Urdu, Pakistan's national language, might pose a risk to security. "The personnel security officer said she thought there was something that didn't seem right," Cole says. "I went through the file, and it stuck out a mile: she was the daughter of a retired Pakistani general who had been their military attaché in Washington." He adds that, to his knowledge, "Every single military attaché they've ever assigned has been a known intelligence officer."
After September 11, this association looked especially risky. The Pakistani intelligence service had trained and supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, and still contained elements who were far from happy with President Pervez Musharraf's pro-American policies. Cole gave his findings to the security officer. "Well done," she said. "You've found it."
A week later, she called Cole again, to say that the woman had started work that morning with a top-secret security clearance. F.B.I. director Robert Mueller had promised Congress that the bureau would hire lots of new Middle Eastern linguists, and normal procedures had been short-circuited as a result. As of July 2005, the woman was still a bureau translator. Sibel Edmonds said she remembers her well - as the leader of a group that pressed for separate restrooms for Muslims.
Cole says the incident was only one of several that caused him to doubt the quality and security of the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, and, like Edmonds, he says he tried to fix the problems he saw by going up the chain of command. Getting rid of an agent of his stature was a lot more difficult than firing a contract linguist. Cole says the retaliation began when, after years of glowing reports, his annual appraisal found his work in one area to be "minimally acceptable." Next, he was placed under investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility, first on a charge that he lied on a routine background check, and then, after he had disclosed classified information without authorization. Finally, he was demoted to menial roles: "They literally had me doing the Xeroxing" Bitterly disillusioned, he says, he resigned in March 2004.
"According to the terms of our employment, whistle-blowing is an obligation," Cole says, "We sign a piece of paper every year saying we will report any mismanagement or evidence of a possible crime. But the management's schtick is that if you draw attention to the bureau's shortcomings you're disgracing it.
Cole is one of about 50 current and former members of the FBI, C.I.A., National Security Agency, and other bodies who have made contact recently with Sibel Edmonds. Another is Mike German, one of the bravest and most successful counterterrorism agents in the bureau's history, who penetrated a neo-Nazi gang in Los Angeles and a militia group in Seattle and brought them to justice.
German made his bed of nails in 2002 when he was asked to get involved in an investigation into a suspected cell of Islamist terrorists. "I came down and reviewed the case, and it was a complete mess," he says. "There were violations of FBI policy and violations of the law. As someone who had been through successful terrorism prosecutions, I knew you couldn't afford to make mistakes."
Like Cole, German says he thought himself obliged to report what was going wrong, not to penalize other agents but in the hope of putting it right. "I though the bureau would do the right thing: that the case would get back on track, and we'd get the opportunity to take action against the bad guys involved." Instead, he says, he faced the familiar litany of escalating retaliation - including an internal investigation of his own work on the terrorist cell case. "Bear in mind that only a handful of people have ever infiltrated terrorist groups," German says. "You'd think that after 9/11 they might have been interested in that. But word came back to me that I'd never get a counterterrorism case again." He resigned from the bureau in June 2004.
As I talked to whistle-blowers, I had the impression that those treated the worst were among the brightest and best. There could be no clearer example than Russ Tice, and 18-year intelligence veteran who has worked for the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) and American's eavesdroppers, the National Security Agency. "I dealt with super-sensitive stuff," he says. "I obviously can't talk about it, but I had operational roles in both Afghanistan and Iraq."
It was at D.I.A. in the spring of 2001 that he wrote a report setting down his suspicions about a junior collage, a Chinese-American who Tice says was living a lavish lifestyle beyond her apparent means. Although she was supposed to be working on a doctorate, he noticed her repeatedly in the office, late at night, reading classified material on an agency computer. "It's not like I obsessed over the issue," Tice says. "I did my job, and then 9/11 happened, and I was a very busy boy."
He moved to the N.S.A. toward the end of 2002. The trigger for his downfall the following April was the arrest of Katrina Leung; the F.B.I. informant accused of spying for China while having an affair with a bureau agent. It prompted Tice to send a classified e-mail to the D.I.A. security section, commenting that the Leung case showed that the F.B.I. was "incompetent." The implication was that the D.I.A. could prove it's competence by fully investigating the junior colleague.
Tice, a big, powerful man with a forthright manner, has to pause to control his emotions when he describes what happened as a consequence. "I was sent for an emergency psychiatric evaluation. I took all the computer tests and passed them with flying colors. But then the shrink says he believes I'm unbalanced. Later he said I'm suffering from "paranoid ideation." He was examined by an independent psychiatrist, who "found no evidence of mental disorder." But he had already been denied access to secure places at N.S.A. As a result, this highly commended technical-espionage expert was put to work in the N.S.A.'s motor pool, "wiping snow off cars, vacuuming them, and driving people around. People looked at me like I had bubonic plague." (The D.I.A. did not respond to a request for comment, and an agency spokesperson said the agency does not discuss personnel matters.)
After about eight months of this purgatory, apparently an attempt to persuade him to resign, he was placed on "administrative leave." Like other whistle-blowers, he tried to redress his treatment. In August 2004, Tice wrote letters to members of the House and Senate. Six days later, the N.S.A. began the formal process which would lead to his getting fired, and to having his clearance revoked permanently. "What happened to me was total Stalin-era tactics," he says. "Everyone I know or ever worked with says I'm perfectly sane. Yet I just don't know what to do next. I've been in intelligence all my life, but without a security clearance, I can't practice my trade."
Echoing Cole and German, one of the congressional staffers who heard Edmonds's secure testimony likens the FBI to a family, "and you don't take your problems outside it. They think they're the best law enforcement agency in the world, that they're beyond criticism and beyond reproach." To an outside observer that ethos alone might explain the use of the state secrets privilege against Edmonds. But, the staffer adds, some of the wiretaps she said she translated "mentioned government officials." Here may lie an entirely different dimension to her case. Vanity Fair has established that around the time the Dickersons visited the Edmondses, in December 2001, Joel Robertz, an F.B.I. special agent in Chicago, contacted Sibel and asked her to review some wiretaps. Some were several years old, others more recent; all had been generated by a counter-intelligence that had its start in 1997. "It became apparent that Chicago was actually the center of what was going on."
Its subject was explosive; what sounded like attempts to bribe elected members of Congress, both Democrat and Republican. "There was pressure within the bureau for a special prosecutor to be appointed and take the case on, "the official says. Instead, his colleagues were told to alter the thrust of their investigation - away from elected politicians and toward appointed officials. "This is the reason why Ashcroft reacted to Sibel in such an extreme fashion," he says "It was to keep this from coming out."
In her secure testimony, Edmonds disclosed some of what she recalled hearing. In all, says a source who was present, she managed to listen to more than 40 of the Chicago recordings supplied by Robertz. Many involved an F.B.I. target at the city's large Turkish Consulate, as well as members of the American-Turkish Consulate, as well as members of the American-Turkish Council and the Assembly of Turkish American Associates.
Some of the calls reportedly contained what sounded like references to large scale drug shipments and other crimes. To a person who knew nothing about their context, the details were confusing and it wasn't always clear what might be significant. One name, however, apparently stood out - a man the Turkish callers often referred to by the nickname "Denny boy." It was the Republican congressman from Illinois and Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert. According to some of the wiretaps, the F.B.I.'s targets had arranged for tens of thousands of dollars to be paid to Hastert's campaign funds in small checks. Under Federal Election Commission rules, donations of less than $200 are not required to be itemized in public filings.
Hastert himself was never heard in the recordings, Edmonds told investigators, and it is possible that the claims of covert payments were hollow boasts. Nevertheless, an examination of Hastert's federal filings shows that the level of un-itemized payments his campaigns received over many years was relatively high. Between April 1996 and December 2002, un-itemized personal donations to the Hastert for Congress Committee amounted to $483,000. In contrast, un-itemized contributions in the same period to the committee run on behalf of the House majority leader, Tom Delay, Republican of Texas, were only $99,000. An analysis of the filings of four other senior Republicans shows that only one, Clay Shaw of Florida, declared a higher total in un-itemized donations than Hastert over the same period: $552,000. The other three declared far less. Energy and Commerce Committee chairman Joe Barton, of Texas, claimed $265,000; Armed Services Committee chairman Duncan Hunter, of California, got $212,000; and Ways and Means Committee chairman Bill Thomas, of California, recorded $110,000.
Edmonds reportedly added that the recordings also contained repeated references to Hastert's flip-flop, in the fall of 2000, over an issue which remains of intense concern to the Turkish government - the continuing campaign to have Congress designate the killings of Armenians in Turkey between 1915 and 1923 a genocide. For many years, attempts had been made to get the house to pass a genocide resolution, but they never got anywhere until August 2000, when Hastert, as Speaker, announced that he would give it his backing and see that it received a full house vote. He had a clear political reason, as analysts noted at the time: a California Republican incumbent, locked in a tight congressional race, was looking to win over his district's large Armenian community. Thanks to Hastert, the resolution, vehemently opposed by the Turks, passed the International Relations Committee by a large majority. Then, on October 19, minutes before the full House vote, Hastert withdrew it.
At the time, he explained his decision by saying that he had received a letter from President Clinton arguing that the genocide resolution, if passed, would harm U.S. interests. Again, the reported content of the Chicago wiretaps may well have been sheer bravado, and there is no evidence that any payment was ever made to Hastert or his campaign. Nevertheless, a senior official at the Turkish Consulate is said to have claimed in one recording that the price for Hastert to withdraw the resolution would have been at least $500,000.
Hastert's spokesman says the congressman withdrew the genocide resolution only because of the approach from Clinton, "and to insinuate anything else just doesn't make any sense." He adds that Hastert has no affiliation with the A.T.C. or other groups reportedly mentioned in the wiretaps: "He does not know these organizations." Hastert is "unaware of Turkish interests making donations," the spokesman says, and his staff has "not seen any pattern of donors with foreign names."
For more than years after Edmonds was fired, the Office of the Inspector General's inquiry ground on. At last, in July 2004, its report was completed - and promptly labeled classified at the behest of the F.B.I. It took months of further pressure before a redacted, unclassified version was finally issued, in January 2005. It seemed to provide stunning vindication of Edmond's credibility.
"Many of Edmonds' core allegations relating to the co-worker [Melek Can Dickerson] were supported by either documentary evidence or witnesses," the report said. "We believe that the F.B.I. should have investigated the allegations more thoroughly."
The F.B.I. had justified firing Edmonds on the grounds that she had a "disruptive effect," the report went on. However, "this disruption related primarily to Edmonds' aggressive pursuit of her allegations of misconduct, which the F.B.I. did not believe were supported and which it did not adequately investigate. In fact, as we described throughout our report, many of her allegations had basis in fact," the report read. "We believe ... that the F.B.I. did not take them seriously enough, and that her allegations were, in fact, the most significant factor in the F.B.I.'s decision to terminate her services."
Meanwhile, Edmonds had new lawyers: the A.C.L.U.'s Ann Beeson, who is leading the challenge to the state-secrets privilege, and Mark Zaid, a private attorney who specializes in national-security issues. Zaid has filed a $10 million tort suit, citing the threats to Edmonds's family, her inability to look after her real-estate and business interests in Turkey, and a series of articles in the Turkish press that have vilified her.
In July 2004, a federal district court had ruled in favor of the government's use of the state-secrets privilege. Like Ashcroft's declaration, its opinion contained no specific facts. Next came a bizarre hearing in the D.C. appeals court in April 2005. The room was cleared of reporters while Beeson spoke for 15 minutes. Then Beeson and Edmonds were also expelled to make way for the Department of Justice lawyers, who addressed the judges in secret. Two weeks later, the court rejected Edmond's appeal, without expanding on the district court's opinion. At press time, she was set to file a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court. If the court agrees to take the case, the government's reasons for its actions may finally be forced into the open; legal experts say the Supreme Court has never allowed secret arguments.
A week after the April appeal hearing, Edmonds gathered more than 30 whistle-blowers from the F.B.I., C.I.A., National Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies to brief staffers from the House and Senate. Among the whistle-blowers were Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times in 1971, and Coleen Rowley, the F.B.I. agent from Minneapolis who complained that Washington ignored local agents who in August 2001 had raised concerns about a flight student named Zacharias Moussoui, who has since admitted being an al-Qaeda terrorist.
Many of those present had unearthed apparent breaches of national security; many aid their careers had been wrecked as a result. At a press conference after the briefings, Congressman Edward Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts, praised Edmonds and her colleagues as "national heroes," pledging that he would introduce a bill to make it a crime for any agency manager to retaliate against such individuals. Afterward, the whistle-blowers mingled over hors d'oeuvres and explored their common ground and experiences. By July, they are working to formalize their not-for-profit campaign group, the National Security Whistleblowers Coalition. "When they took on Sibel," says Mike German, who is now the coalition's congressional liaison, "they made the wrong woman mad."
"I'm going to keep pushing this as long as I can, but I'm not going to get obsessional," Edmonds says. "There are other things I want to do with my life. But the day the Iranians tried to arrest me, my father told me, "Sibel, you only live your life once. How do you choose to live? According to your principles, or in fear?" I have never forgotten those words."
Copyright Vanity Fair. Reprinted for Fair Use educational purposes only.

vrijdag, oktober 27, 2006

KIRKUK PROBLEEM

Laten we even teruggaan in de geschiedenis. Koerdistan was een land en het werd afgepikt en verdeeld over 4 landen. Kerkuk behoorde tot de koerdische gebied. Voor saddam waren 60 % en meer koerdisch( in kerkuk) , nu saddam weg is zien we dat 60 % en meer arabieren en turkmenen zijn. Huh hoe kan dat nou? Saddam heeft arabieren GEDWONGEN in kerkuk te wonen. Hij heeft honderduizenden koerden uit hun stad verdreven. Hij heeft huizen kappot gemaakt , etc. Dat allemaal om te proberen te laten zien dat Kerkuk een arabische stad is. Mag dit wel ? De Islam leerde mij dit : de waarheid moet gezegd worden. Kerkuk was geen iraakse stad , nu wel. En of het land bij irak zal horen , dat weet alleen Allah. Maar wat is voor jullie belangrijkste ? Nog een brandende irak om een stad als kerkuk? OF willen jullie in vrede leven. Ik kies voor vrede en eerlijkheid. Allerbelangrijkste is vrede en veiligheid en niks anders voor Irak op dit moment.Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

KOERDEN IN TURKIJE ONDERDRUKT

De Turken hebben de Koerden jarenlang zwaar onderdrukt (Saddam heeft alleen maar zijn best gedaan bij wijze van spreken). vb. veel Koerden kennen niet eens hun eigen taal, er bestaat niets meer als een algemeen beschaafd Koerdisch. De meeste Koerden wonen tegenwoordig in Istanboel of een andere grootstad vanwege het feit dat hun dorpen onleefbaar zijn gemaakt enz...enz.. en nog veel meer...Met als resultaat dat de Koerden er serieus de pest aan hebben.De Turken van hun kant hebben jarenlang alles wat fout ging op de Koerden en meer bepaald de PKK gestoken. Ze zijn zodanig gefrustreerd geraakt voor alles wat Koerdisch is dat het horen van een vb. een Koerdisch liedje al genoeg is om er beginnen op te kloppen. En dan hebben ze nog hun helden die gestorven zijn voor het vaderland om het te weren van het Koerdische onheil/gevaar.

Irak valt zo wie zo uiteen, daar valt niet veel meer aan te doen. De Turken hebben nu al last met hun +-20.000.000 koerdische inwoners die ze jarenlang onderdrukt hebben. De Turken doen het zo wie zo liever achter gesloten deuren. Zonder buitenstaanders erbij (zonder de EU bijvoorbeeld).De EU kunnen ze toch vergeten op lange termijn!Hun toetreding is toch niet voor op korte termijn.Zolang kunnen ze hun masker niet ophouden. Ze zullen zeker geen 10 of 15 jaar wachten om openlijk te bougeren, de publieke opinie in Turkije laat dat niet toe.Ten laatste nog voor de volgende verkiezingen zullen ze (moeten) ingrijpen. Turkse interventie in Noord-Irak, nooit van zijn leven. Zo'n daad betekent de definitieve breuk tussen Turkije en het westen, voornamelijk de VS. En Turkije kan nu eenmaal niet leven zonder de dollars van Washington. En de mensen die beweren dat Noord-Irak een zaak van leven op dood is en dat Turkije daarom wel zal interveniëren...hierop kan ik zo antwoorden: Ankara is zo afhankelijk van Washington dat het zonder zijn goedkeuring niks maar dan ook niks zal ondernemen...ook al is het een zaak van leven op dood.
Dat de Koerden in Noord-Irak hun soevereniteit gaat krijgen, prikkelt natuurlijk de drang van de Turkse Koerden, maar ook die van Syrië en Iran. Maar in hoeverre zijn deze staten in staat om het proces in Noord-Irak een halt toe te roepen. oké, ze hebben daar wel hun spionnen en "opstandelingen" die daar chaos creëren. Maar de steun van de VS maken de Koerden een beetje 'untouchable'.Dus wie riskeert Noord-Irak binnen te vallen zal stuiten op de machtige Amerikaanse tanks. En die Amerikaanse tanks zullen niet aan de grens blijven steken, ze zullen oversteken. Wie neemt de risico's...Syrië? of Iran? De VS is toch al aan het uitkijken voor een geldige reden om die twee landen bij de kraag te vatten. Voor Turkije is het niet anders. Als de Amerikanen vinden dat een Koerdische staat hun belangen in het midden-Oosten beter dient dan Turkije, zullen ze Turkije met slechts één pennestreep tot vijand uitroepen. Net zoals ze dat gedaan hebben met Saddam van Irak.Dus wat kunnen die buurlanden dan nog doen zonder een bommenregen van de Amerikaanse vliegers te moeten vrezen...de Koerden in hun eigen land geven wat ze willen, dus democratie, rechten en vrijheid.En wat als op termijn de Koerden beslissen om samen één Groot-koerdistan te vormen... Weer het zelfde: ofwel een oorlog riskeren met de VS, die toch altijd naar redenen zoekt om een grote legermacht te ontplooien in het Midden-Oosten, ofwel goede buren worden met Koerdistan.






Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

maandag, oktober 23, 2006

Türkler Joseph Ralston’un kol düğmelerinden nefret ediyor


DIYARBEKIR, 21/10 2006 — PKK Kordinatoru emekli general Joseph Ralston, Türklerin hedefi haline geldi. Ralston’un Atatürk armalı kol düğmeleri Türkleri çileden çıkarıyor. AKP’li Turhan Çömez, Joseph Ralston’un Atatürk resimli kol düğmeler ile Türkleri kandırmaya çalıştığını söyledi. Cevizkapuğu programına katılan Edip Başer de kordinasyon sistemi ile ilgili kuşkuları olduğunu söyledi. Hulki Cevizoğlu karşısında suçlu gibi duran Edip Başer görevi bırakma hazırlıklarını yapıyor olabilir. Türkler başından beri kordinasyon sistemine sıcak bakmıyorlardı ve süreci engellemek için çeşitli yolları deneyebilirler.
Türkler hertatarftan ve herkesten kuşku duyuyor. Kendileri ile ilgili pozitif konuşmalardan korkuyor ve kendilerine verilen desteğin altında ‘kötü niyet’ olduğuna inanıyorlar. Nitekim Orhan Pamuk’un Nobel edebiyat ödülünü almış olmasının altında derin ve kötü emellerin olduğuna inanıyorlar ve Türk medyası da bunun yoğun propagandasını yapıyor. Türk devlet’inin denetiminde geliştirilen bu propaganda sıradan insanları da etkiliyor.
Dün gece Ceviz Kapuğu programına katılan AKP Balıkesir milletvekili Turhan Çömez, ABD kordinatörü Joseph Ralston’un Türkleri kandırmak için Atatürk resimli kol düğmeleri kullandığını söyledi. Çömez daha önce, ASAM’ın düzenlediği bir toplantıda Joseph Ralston ile karşılaşmış ve çeşitli konularda eleştiri içerikli sorular sormuştu.
Ceviz Kabuğu programına katılan Türk tarafının PKK kordinatörü Edip Başer de her konuşmasında kendisini kurtarma çabası içerisindeydi. Edip Başer her konuda sanki kendisi karar veriyormuş gibi ve sanki onun üzerinde hükümet ve devlet mercisi yokmuş gibi ‘Eğer şöyle olmazsa çekilirim’ diyordu.
Oysa Edip Başer, Türk hükümeti ve Türk genelkurmay başkanlığı tarafından atanmış bir kişidir. Normal şartlarda ve ‘devlet gibi bir devlet’te’ sen yapmazsan başkaları yapar ve kendisine güle güle denilir. O çekilirse başka biri aynı görevi yürütür. Ama Türk devleti çözülme sürecini yaşadığı için, herkes kendisini kurtarmaya çalışıyor ve marjinal guruplar devleti etkilemeğe çalişıyor. Daha doğrusu her çete hakim olduğu alanda istediği gibi davranıyor. Öyle olmazsa Hulki Cevizoğlu ve Ümit Özdağ gibi marjinaller devlet yetkililerini ve Şükrü Elekdağ gibi poltikacıları sorguya çekemezlerdi.
Tabii Edip Başer’in de her Türk yetkilisi gibi çok önemli bir sorunu var. İstek ile güç arasındaki dengesizlik. Türk medyasının propagandası ve Türk yalanlarının etkisi ile, Türkler, kendilerini dev aynasında görüyor, ‘çıtayı’ yüksek tutuyorlar. Güçleri ise isteklerine takabül etmiyor ve her allanda çuvallıyor veya çuvvallanıyorlar.
İstek ile güç arasındaki dengesizlik arasında kalan bürokrat ve politikacıları, Ümit Özdağ ve Hulki Cevizoğlu gibi kişilerin hayalleri ile kısa bir süre bile olsa mutlu oluyor ve Türklerin gerçekten güç sahibi olduğunu zannediyorlar.
Oysa Ümit Özdağ ve gibilerinin strateji olarak pohpohladıkları şeyler hayal ürünüdür ve hasta kafaların ürettiği fikirlerdir. Uygulanması mümkün değil, praktiğe konulması ise Türk devletinin yıkılmasını sadece daha da yakınlaştırır.

Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

Yaşar Buykanit di çiriya pêşî de diçe Yûnanistanê

KK-Nûçe
DIYARBEKIR, 17/10 2006 — Serokerkanê tirkan Yaşar Buyukanit di çiriya pêşî (11-2006) de diçe Yûnanistanê. Li gor agahiyên medyaya tirkan, serokerkanê yûnaniyan Panagiotis Hinofotisî ew vexwendiye û armanca ziyaretê xurtkirina pêwendiyên di navbera eskerê herdu dewletan de ye. Serokerkanê yûnaniyan di 26-28-ê temûza 2006-ê de, piştî 32 salan, çû bû Tirkiyeyê û tirkan û yûnaniyan hingê qerar dabûn ko tetbîqatekê di çiriya pêşî ya 2006-ê de li deryaya Ege bikin.
Herçenda tirk dibêjin serokerkanê yûnanî serokerkanê tirk vexwendiye jî, lê têt zanîn ko tirkan berê serokerkanê yûnanî vexwendibûn Tirkiyeyê û piştî 32 salan cara ewil bû ko serokerkanek yûnanî diçû Tirkiyeyê. Bi gotineka dî ziyareta Buyukanitî dewama ziyareta serokerkanê yûnanî ye û ziyaretên di navbera herdu dewletan de ne bi însiyatîfa yûnaniyan lê bi ya tirkan dest pê kir.
Niqteya herî giring di hevdtinên tirk û yûnaniyan de ew bû ko dê eskerê herdu dewletan di çiriya pêşî de li ser behra Egeyê tetbîqateka eskerî bikin.
Tirk di vê sala dawî de kar dikin pêwendiyên bi yûnaniyan re nerm bikin. Heger armanca tirkan ne ew be ko bi yûnaniyan re li hev bikin jî dixazin yûnanî li himber wan ji aliyê eskerî ve bêteref bimînin. Herçenda di şertên nomrmal de tirk hesabek mezin bo yûnaniyan nekin jî, lê heger tirkan niyeta tişteka dî hebe pêwist dibînin hidûdên rojavayê Tirkiyeyê saxlem bikin da bikarin li cihek dî tevgerê bikin.


Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

TURK YALANLARI

Türkler çok devlet kurmuş olmakla övünürler. Daha doğrusu devşirme takımı, Türkler’in 16 devlet kurduğunu ve Türk Cumhurbaşkan’ının forsundaki 16 yıldız’ın 16 Türk devletini temsil ettiğini iddia ediyorlar. Bu sadece bir iddia değil, kitaplara geçmiş Türk yalanlarından bir tanesidir. Köksüzler, yalan tarih ile övünüyorlar. Tabii bazıları da devlet sayısını artırarak, daha bir tarihi olur hesabı ile yüzlerce Türk devletinden söz ediyorlar. Türkler’in en haşmetlileri 16 devletin tamamen yalan olduğunu söylüyor.
Türk söylemine bakılırsa, Türk’ün kafası bozulduğu zaman birkaç devleti yıkıp yerine birkaç devlet kurar. İşi gücü devlet kurup yıkmak olmuş Türk’ün. Kimilerine göre Türkler 16 değil 116 devlet kurmuş. Hakikat ise tamamen farklıdır. En şedit Türkçüler için dahi Türk’ün bir tanımı yok. Kimlerin Türk sayılıp sayılmayacağı belli değil. Ama farzedelimki olğanüstü yaratık ‘Metal Fırtanalar’ yaratan ‘Çılgın Türk’ bilmediğimiz, tanımadığımız bir şeydir. Peki bu Türk gerçekten 16 devlet kurmuş mu?
Önce Murat Belge’den başlayalım.
Murat Belge 26-Kasım-2005 Radikal gazetesindeki yazısında 16 Türk devletinin yalan olduğunu ve Kemalist Türk milliyetçisi prof. Coşkun Üçok’un bu konuda söylediklerini aktarıyor.
Murat Belge şöyle yazıyor:
“Efsaneyi icat etmiş kişiye Coşkun Üçok 'her kimse' ve 'birisi'nden daha fazla yaklaşamıyor. 12 Eylül Vaka-i Hayriye'sinin ışığı altında yaşadığımız 80'lerde, Ankara Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü 1984-85 ders yılı açılış töreninde bu 16 devleti tanıtan bir kitapçık dağıtmış. Bu bilim kurumunun sunduğu bu faydalı eserde, Üçok'un anlattığına göre, Attila'nın Hunları İ.S. değil de İ.Ö. 5. yüzyılın Türk devleti olarak tanıtılınca, ortaya 1000 yıllık bir fark çıkmış. Uygurların 'matbaa tekniği'ni 'keşfettikleri' de söylenmiş. Karahanlılar devletinde halk tamamen Türk ve kısmen İranlıdır denmiş. Bu da ancak Türklere özgü bir marifet olsa gerek. Ayrıca, Altınordu devleti içinde yer alan bir Cuci ulusu varmış.”
Tabii tarihin eskisi daha kiymetlidir ve Türk tarihini mümkün oldukça eskitmekte yarar gören ‘Bilim Kurumu’, Ankara Üniversitesi, Türk tarihini bin yıl eskitmiş oluyor.
Murat Belge 16 devlet hikayesi ile igili de şöyle yazıyor.
[Geçenlerde '16 Türk Devleti'nin hangileri olduğunu soruyordum.
Bazı arkadaşlar uyardı ve hatırlattı: Bizim Tarih ve Toplum'un 38. sayısında (Ocak 1987) yayımlanmış olan, Coşkun Üçok'un bu konudaki yazısı... Coşkun Üçok, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi'nin saygıdeğer bir profesörüydü. Milliyetçiliğinin, Kemalizm'inin de bir eksiği yoktu. Onun için, bu konuda söylediklerini ciddiye almakta herhalde bir sakınca görülmez.
Ama Coşkun Üçok bu '16 devlet'in hiçbir temeli olmadığını söylüyor. Şöyle bir alıntı vereyim: "Cumhurbaşkanlığı forsunun üst sol köşesinde bulunan güneşi çevreleyen 16 yıldızı her kimse, birisi a priori olarak bu yıldızların 16 Türk devletini simgelediğini kabul etmiş ve sonra da tutmuş her yıldıza bir devleti münasip görmüş. Ancak Türk tarihi hakkında, herhalde yeterli bilgisi olmadığı için, küçükleri bırakıp büyük bütün Türk devletlerini saysa bile 16 sayısını çok aşacağı için hiçbir ölçüte uymayarak keyfi bir biçimde 16 devletin adını sıralamıştır. Bunların içinde Türk oldukları kuşkulu olanlar bulunduğu gibi, devlet kurucularının Türk olmadıkları kesin olanlar da vardır. Buna karşılık kurucusu da, halkı da öz be öz Türk olanlar bu 16 içinde yer almamışlardır. İşin daha hoş yanı bu devletler içinden birini çıkarıp yerine başkası da konulabilmiştir. 15 Kasım 1983'te Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti kurulunca, bu küçük devlete 16'lar içinde yer verilebilmesi için o zamana kadar kitaplarda, broşürlerde, posterlerde yer alan Panu'nun kurmuş olduğu Batı Hun İmparatorluğu (48-216) listeden çıkarılmış ki, 16 sayısı bozulmasın."] (http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=171101 15-07-2006 00:10)
Bir de kafatası ölçen Nihal Atsız’ın 16 devlet yalanı ile ilgili söyledikleri var. Nihal Atsız, 16 devlet’in tamamen uydurma olduğunu söylüyor. Atsız’ın Türklük konusunda kafası oldukça karışıktır, kafatası ölçüyor. Kimin Türk kimin Türk olmadığını bilmiyor. Türklüğü oldukça karışık buluyor ve karıştırıyor. Ölçüsüzdür. Kafatası ölçüyor ama ölçüsü yok.
Nihal Atsız 1969 da Ötüken dergisinin 65. sayısında ’16 Masal devlet ve uydurma bayraklar’ başlıklı makalesinde şöyle yazıyor:
“Her şeyimiz gibi tarihimiz de henüz kesin şeklini almış değildir. Türk tarihi nerden başlayıp hangi gidişi takip eder, kimler Türk`tür? Bunlar henüz belli değildir. Daha önce de belirttiğimiz gibi bazı büyük şahsiyetlerin Türk olup olmadığı üzerinde bile tarihçilerimiz arasında birlik yoktur.”
Nihal Atsız’ın Yaşar Kemal ile arkadaş olduğunu, Nihal Atsız’ın oğlu Yağmur Atsız bir röportajında söyledi. Eğer Nihal Atsız, Yaşar Kemal’in arkadaşı ise bu işte bir ‘bit yeniği var’. Uzun yüzlü ve hiç’te Asyalı’lara benzemeyen Nihal Atsız ‘Doğulu’ olabilir mi? Atsız.org sitesine göre Gümüşhane, Yozgat dolaylarındandır. Gümüşhane ve Yozgatta hala apocular eylem yapıyor, haledilmemiştir. Orada Türk yok.
Nihal Atsız Türkler’i Asya’dan gelme hesaplıyor ve onun için de rüyasında bütün Türklerin Tanrı Dağı etrafında toplayıp ulumalarını hayal ediyor. Atsız’ın hayallerini gerçekleştirmek lazım. Var iseler dönmelerine yardım etmek lazım.
Nihal Atsiz 16 yalan ile ilgili şöyel yazıyor:
[Şimdiye kadar 16 büyük Türk devleti kurulduğu hakkındaki kararı kimin verdiği belli değildir…
Cumhurbaşkanlığı forsundaki 16 yıldızın 16 büyük Türk devletini temsil ettiği hakkında şimdiye kadar benim hiçbir bilgim yoktu. Bu gibi konularla ilgilenen birisi olarak ben bu sembolü bilmedikten sonra acaba bunu kimler biliyordu? Yoksa bu da bir millî sırdı da ancak şimdi mi açığa vurulması uygun görüldü?
16 Türk devleti efsanesini, sayın Tekin Ererin Ocak 1969`da kendi sütununda yazdığı "Türklüğün 16 Avizesi" başlıklı makaleden öğrendim. Bu makalede sayılan 16 devlet arasında Samanlılar gibi Türk olmayan devlet bulunduğu gibi Akkoyunlular, Karakoyunlular, Safeviler, Mısır Kölemenleri gibi büyük ve muhteşem Türk devletlerinden bahsedilmeyişi, hele cihan tarihinin en büyük imparatorluğu olan Çengiz devletinin anılmayışı konuyu daha başlangıçta sakat hale getirmektedir.]
İşte Türk’ün vaziyeti budur. Tarih de karar ile yapılıyor. Birileri karar veriyor ve tarih oluyor. Türklük hiçbir tarihi, kültürel, etnik ve sosyal yapıya dayanmıyor. Karar verip tarih yapıyorlar, karar verip dil yapıyorlar, karar verip din yapıyorlar, karar verip millet kuruyorlar.
Nihal Atsız da problemin farkındadır ve kararlaştırılan tarih’in çok sayıda devletten söz etmesini yanlış buluyor, problemlere yola açacağını biliyor, düşürüyor.
Nihal Atsız anılan makalesinde şöyle yazıyor:
[16 büyük devlet... Tabii, Karamanoğulları ve daha küçükleri gibi ötekilerini de sayınca bu rakam kabaracak, en aşağı 50 devlet olacaktır. 50 devlet kurmayı bir başarı saymak, ilk bakışta mümkün gürünebilir. Fakat madalyonun ters tarafına dönünce iş tamamiyle değişir. Adama sorarlar: Elli devlet kurdun da neden hiçbirini yaşatamadın? Neden kala kala orta çapta bir Türkiye Cumhuriyetine kaldın?". Zoraki tarih bilginleri tabii bu sorunun cevabını veremeyeceklerdir. Çünkü tarihî gerçek hiç de öyle değildir. 16 veya 50 devlet kurulmuş değildir. Gerçekte anayurtta bir, nihayet iki devlet kurulmuş, anayurt dışında da buna üç beş devlet daha eklenmiştir. O kadar.] (http://www.atsiz.org/makaleler/goster.php?tab=articles&articleid=1019 15-07-2006 00:15)
Ya demek o kadar? O kadar da ama ne kadar? Bir tane mi, iki tane mi, üç tane mi? Belli değil. Türk’ün nesi belli ki devlet sayısı belli olsun?
Nihal Atsıza göre Moğular da Türk. Moğullar Türk ise neden Çinliler Türk olmuyor hayret edilecek bir durum. Ama nihayetinde Nihal Atsız da Türkler için yazıyor. O da tarih kuruyor. Beş paralık değerinin olmadığını biliyor.
Bir de ’tarih bilmini’ yazan, her dokunduğunu ’bilimsellike’leştiren ve her tarafından bilim fışkıran görevli, Yalçın Küçük, var. Küçük’e göre Türkler tek bir tane devlet kurmuş. Yani şimdi varolan devlet. Yalçın Küçük'e göre bu devlet 1999’dan sonra çözülmüştür.
Yalçın Küçük şöyle yazıyor:
[Ne oldu, Elenler’in, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, ve Kıbrıs Çıkartmasının revanını aldıkları söylenebilir, haklılığı var ancak tartışmaya açıktır. Bunun ötesinde ben Türk Devleti’nin sona erdilişinin tartşılabilir olduğunu düşünmüyorum, gösterebilmeği umuyorum; ancak kaçıncısı sona ermektedir, işte bu tartışmalıdır. Burada söylenebilecekleri kısaca şöyle sırayabiliriz: a) Türk devletlerinin sayısının on altı olduğunu söylemek, fazla inandırıcı görünmemektedir. b) Türk köleler tarafından kurulduğu ve yönetildiği kesin, Gazneliler Devleti’ne ”Türk” diyebilmek çok zor görünmektedir. Bilimsel açıdan zorluk var, yöneten dinastinin Türk olması, ”Türk Devleti” demek için hiçbir zaman yeterli sayılmamaktadır.]
Yalçın Küçük, devamla, İran’da ”Türk” kökenlilerin kurdukları ya da yöneticilik yaptığı devletlerden söz ediyor, ama onların Türk devleti olamayacağını yazıyor ve hiçbir tarihçinin bunları Türk devleti saymadığını yazıyor.
Yalçın Küçük devam ediyor:
[Öyleyse bize ”bilge” veya ”tekin” türü isimlerle, ulusal kimlik için ince bir ağıt olan Orhun Yazıları’nı bırakanları bir kenara koyarsak, Cumhurriyet Türkiyesi, biz Türkler’in kurdukları ilk ve son ”tam teşeküllü” Türk Devleti’dir. 10 Aralık 1999 ta-rihi itibarıyla bundan vazgeçtiğimizi ilân etmiş bulunuyoruz.] (Yalçın Küçük, 2002, s. 260)
Yalçın Küçük’ün kafası da Nihal Atsızın ki gibi karşıktır. Asya Türkçülerine nazaran Türklüğü daraltıyor. Kime Türk denmesi gerektiğini bilmiyor. Asya bağlantılı Türklüğe inanmıyor. Daha çok devşirmeleri Türk kabul ediyor ve özellikle Balkan devşirmelerini öne çıkarıyor. Ama ’Türklü’ğe bir yer bulamıyor.
Bulamaz çünkü Türk; Türk devleti kurulduktan sonra, yönetici gurubun, Avrupalı’ların emri ile, kendilerine yakıştırdığı bir isimdir. Türk’lüğü Asya ile bağlantılı gösterenler; Alman, İngiliz ve Ruslardır. Tamamen politik nedenlere dayanıyor. Tarih, kültür, etnitise ve sosyal yapı ile ilgili değil.
Yalçın Küçük’ün ”ilk ve son” devleti ise, Asya’dan gelenlerin devleti olmadığı açıktır. Asya’dan gelenler, ne sayıca ne de kabilliyet olarak bir devlet’e sahip olabilecek güce sahip değiller. Bugün hala Türkiye sayılan topraklarda yaşayan, bir veya birden fazla milletin, gurubun devleti de değil. Yani Türk Devleti, Kürtlerin, Lazlar’ın, Rumlar’ın, Pomak’ların, Pontos’ların, Gürcüler’in, Araplar’ın, Çerkezler’in ve diğerlerinin devleti değil. Türk devleti tamamen dış-güçlerin ihtiyacına göre kurulmuştur.
Türk Devleti, Devlet Bahçeli’nin partisini 2003 yılının sonlarına kadar düşman sayıyordu. MGK, devletin parçalanmasına neden olabilir gerekçesi ile damgalamıştı. MHP hükümete ortak olduğu zaman, MHP’li savunma bakanı önemli savunma toplantılarına katılamıyordu, askeri dış anlaşmalar toplantılarına katılması yasaklanmıştı.
Türk devleti; ”çimentocuların” İslami ve solcuların, devleti de dğil. Solcular sadece ”dayaklık” olarak kullanılmış, İslamilerin hangi durumda olduğu da AKP, Saadet Partisi ve diğerlerinin yaşadıkları ile ortadadır. Hala hanımlarını işyerlerine götüremiyorlar.
Türk devletinin gerçek sahibi, Kemalistler’in durumu da acılı ve acıklıdır. Artık Türk devletinin sahibi değiller. Kemalist önder kadrolar, Türk devlet’inin silahlı elemanları tarafından öldürülüyor, gazeteleri bombalanıyor, askeriyeden ve universitelerden uzaklaştırılıyor.
Yani Türk devleti bir geçiş süreci yaşıyor, çöküş sürecidir. Bugünkü biçimi ile yaşaymayacağı kesindir. Çözülmesinden nelerin ortaya çıkacağı belli değil.
Türk kelimesi, araştırılmaya değer ve onu daha sonraki bir yazıya bırakıyorum. Ama ”Türk” kelimesi’nin ne zaman kullanıldığı açık değil, oldukça geç kullanılmaya başlanmıştır, ne anlama geldiği de belli değil.


Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

donderdag, oktober 19, 2006

Orhan Pamuk ve Ermeni soykirimi

Orhan Pamuk’un Nobel Edebiyat Ödülünü almış olması Türkleri sevindirmedi. Türkler Orhan Pamuk’u Atatürk ve Kemalizm düşmanı, emperyalizmin adamı görüyor. Orhan Pamuk’un ’Ermeni Katliam’ı ile ilgili söyledikleri ve Fransa parlamentosunun ’Ermeni Katliamın’ı inkar’ı suç sayan yasayı kabul etmeğe denk gelmesi, Türkleri daha da kızdırdı. Türkler Orhan Pamuk’un kitpalarının anlaşılmaz olduğunu ve kimsenin kitaplarını okumadığını iddia ediyorlar.
Svenska Akademien’in genel sekreteri Horace Engdahl, Orhan Pamuk’a ödülün verilmesinin nedenini ’Roman’da yaptığı yenilik’ olarak açıkladı. Engdahl yeniliği de iki kültürün, Avrupa-Ortadoğu, kültürlerinin birleştirilmesi olarak izah etti. Orhan Pamuk’un şehrini yani İstanbulu anlattığını ve tarihi olayları romanlarında ustaca kullandığını söyledi.
Horace Engdahl ödül’ün verilmesinde politik olayların ve eğilimlerin etkisinin olmadığını ve Orhan Pamuk’a bu yıl ödülün verilmesinin de özel bir anlam taşımadığını söyledi. Ödül kendisine, geçen yıl verilmiş olabileceği gibi gelecek yıl da verilebilirdi.
Horace Engdahl Ola Larsmo ile yaptığı mülaktta; Orhan Pamuk her nekadar politik olaylara karışmadığını söylüyorsa da temelde politik bir kişi olduğunu söyledi. Engdah, Orhan Pamuk’un bazen, belki iradesi, dışında politik olaylar ile ilgili görüş belirtmek veya tutum almak zorunda kaldığını söyledi.
Türklerin Orhan Pamuk’un ödül almış olmasına sevindiklerini söylemek oldukça zor görünüyor. Türkler’in Orhan Pamuk’a kızmalarının tek nedeni ’Ermeni Katliam’ı ile ilgili söyledikleri değil. Orhan Pamuk o açıklamayı yapmadan önce de Kemalis ve Kızıl Elmacıların hedefi haline gelmişti. Elmacılar Orhan Pamuk’un Atatürk ve Türk devleti düşmanı olduğuna ilan etmişlerdi. Özellikle Cumhurriyet gaztesei ve Türk medyasının diğer önemli bir kısmı, Orhan Pamuk’un meşhurlaşmasını Türk devletine düşmanlık temelinde geliştiğini iddia ediyorlar ve bunun propagandasını yapıyorlar.
Svenska Akademien tarihinde ilk kez Türkçe yazan bir yazara ödül veriyor. Her ne kadar ’edebi’ ve ’edebi omayan’ arasında belirgin bir sınır olmazsa da, genellikle ’edebi’ olanın dünyada kabul edilen bazı kriterleri vardır. Ama masa başında ve karar ile yapılmış bir ’dil’ ile yazılan kitapları edebi saymak ve ödüllendirmek oldukça problemlidir.

Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

TURK ORDUSU KARISIYOR

— Türk kuvvet komutanlarının üçü (Kara, Deniz ve Hava) ile genel kurmay başkanı konuştu. Her üçünün de konuşması belli güçlere yönelikti ve aşağı yukarı aynı şeyleri tekrarladılar. Jandarma kuvvetleri komutanı Işık Koşaner ise şimdiye kadar konuşmamış ve işin garip yanı Türk medyası bu durumu sorgulamıyor. Işık Koşaner’in değişik bir ’takıma’ ait olduğu söyleniyor. Bazı iddialara göre Jandarma genel komutan olması tasfiyesi anlamına geliyordu. Işık Koşaner’in Kara Kuvvetleri komutanı İlker Başbuğ ile birlikte Kürdistan gezisine katıldığı söylenmişti ama fotoğraflarda pek görünmemişti.
Bugün gazetesinden Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu bir yazısında Işık Koşaner’in Jandarma Kuvvetleri komutanlığına getirilmesi tasfiyesi anlamına geliyor ve Koşaner Hüsseyin Kıvrıkoğlu gurubundan olduğu için tasfiye edildiğini yazıyor.
Lale sarıibrahimoğlu askeriyeyi tanıyan bazı uzmanlar ile konuştuğunu şöyle yazıyor:
[Bu uzman kişiler, normalde İkinci Başkanlık görevinde bir yıl daha kalması gereken Koşaner'in Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı'na atanmasının aslında bir tasfiye operasyonu olduğu yolundaki görüşüme katıldılar.
Ama aynı kişiler, "AKP'ye yakındı da onun için tasfiye edildi" şeklinde komplo teorileri üretenlerin düşüncesinin tersine, Orgeneral Koşaner'le ilgili atamanın 31 Ağustos itibariyle emekli olacak olan Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'den önce Genelkurmay Başkanlığı yapan emekli Orgeneral Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu döneminden kalan komutanların tasfiyesi şeklinde görülmesi gerektiğinin önemle altını çizdiler.]
Işık Koşaner jandarma komutanlığına getirilmeden önce 2. genelkurmay başkanlığı görevini yürütüyordu. Ama öyle görünüyorki güçlü 1. genelkurmay’ın ikincisi ’merkez valiliği’ gibi bir şeydir. Yani 2. genelkurmaylık işlevsiz bir görevdir.
Işık Koşaner 2. genelkurmay iken Murat Yetkin ile konuşmuş ve askeriye içerisind hakim kliklerin düşüncesine ters bazı beyanlarda bulunmuştu. Koşaner Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Cumhurbaşkanı olabileceğini ve Emine Erdoğan’ın kapalılığının buna engel olmadığını söylemişt. Murat Yetkin konuştuğu kişinin kim olduğunu söylememişti ama genelkurmay başkanlığı tarihinde ilk kez, gazeteci (Murat Yekin) ile konuşan kişinin Işık Koşaner olduğunu açıklamıştı. Ve Koşaner’in kendi adına konuştuğu yazılı olarak beyan etmişti.
Şimdi ’irtica’ ve ’devrim’ tartışmaları olurken, Işık Koşaner piyasada yok. Ne açıklaması var ne de tartışılan konularda fikir beyan etmiştir.
Hilmi Özkök’ün emekli olması sonrasında, Türk ordusu ’çok başlı’ bir görüntü veriyor. Esas olark devleti yöneten Yaşar Büyükanıt ve İlker Başbuğ’dur. Ama her ikisinin de çok anlaştıkları söylenemez.
Hilmi Özkök’te orduyu başka guruplar ile ittifak kurarak idare edebiliyordu. Uzun bir süreden beridir, Türk ordusu, askeri koalisyonlar tarafından yönetiliyor. Ama Hilmi Özkök’üin emekliye ayrılması sonrasında koalisyonun bir lideri de yok. Guruplar bir nevi bağımsız hareket ediyorlar. Yaşar Büyükanıt ile İlker Başbuğun ilişkileri iki eşit ortak görünütüsünü veriyor ve hatta bazen İlker Başbuğ daha güçlü görünüyor.
Generallerin son bir aydaki konuşmaları oldukça sertti ve bir askeri darbe ile sonuçlanması gerekliğdi. Askeriyede emir komuta zincirinin işlemeyişi, Türkiyedeki dengeler ve uluslararası durum askeri bi inqilabı oldukça zorlaştırıyor. Ama eğer generallerin beyanları AKP hükümetini düşürmeyecekse, ki düşüremeyeceği görünüyor, generaller ve Türk ordusu güç kaybetmiş demektir. Kitleler, ordu’nun da laftan öteye bir şey yapamadığı kanaatine veracaklar ve ordunun otoritesi kaybolacaktır.
Nitekim Mehmet Ağar, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu ve Erkan Mumcu generallerin son konuşmalarını, ABD’nin tutumu belli olduktan sonra, eleştirdiler ve askerin siyasete müdahele etmesine karşı olduklarını söylediler. Oysa bunlar, bir müddet önce de tersine AKP’yi orduyu yıpratmakla itham ediyor ve askeri destekliyorlardı

Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

vrijdag, oktober 13, 2006

Turken tegen armeniers en koerden

De Turkse optreden tegen de Armeniërs valt op te maken waarom de islam wreed en achterlijk is. Dit is een harde bewijs dat Islamitische geloof verweven met wreedheden en de fundamenten van de Turkse staat. het is nu overduidelijk da de onderdrukking en uitroeiing van de christelijke minderheid in Turkije een officiële werk van de overheid is. De systematische vervolging van de Koerden is nu niet meer et verbergen!!. Men is bezorgd over het gewelddadige optreden van Turks-islamitische staat; De officieus getolereerde terreur tegen de christelijke minderheid wordt steeds brutaler. Ook zie je steeds meer vrouwen in de grote Turkse steden met boerka-achtige gewaden rondlopen

donderdag, oktober 12, 2006

Ontkennen Armeense genocide wordt strafbaar in Frankrijk

Het lagerhuis van het Franse parlement heeft donderdag een wetsvoorstel aangenomen waarin het strafbaar is te ontkennen dat er begin twintigste eeuw een volkerenmoord is gepleegd op de Armeense inwoners van het Ottomaans Rijk. Hoewel de meerderheid van de 577 leden van de Assemblée nationale afwezig was tijdens de stemming, werd het wetsvoorstel aangenomen met 106 stemmen voor en 19 tegen.

De Assemblée Nationale in Parijs heeft donderdag een wet aangenomen die het ontkennen van de genocide op de Armeniërs door de Turken strafbaar stelt. De nieuwe wet houdt in dat personen die bestrijden dat er negentig jaar geleden een genocide onder de Armeniërs heeft plaatsgehad een jaar gevangenisstraf en een boete van maximaal 45.000 euro kunnen krijgen. Het Turkse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken verklaarde dat de beslissing een zware slag betekent voor de Turks-Franse betrekkingen en dat ze voor veel teleurstelling in Turkije heeft gezorgd. Eerder werd in Frankrijk het bestaan van de Armeense genocide al bij wet vastgelegd, maar de nieuwe wet verbindt ook consequenties aan het ontkennen ervan. De Turkse hoofdonderhandelaar voor de besprekingen over toetreding tot de Europese Unie, Ali Babacan, zei donderdag dat de genocidewet indruist tegen de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Ankara vindt de situatie merkwaardig, gezien de eis van de EU aan Turkije om de vrijheid van meningsuiting te vergroten, aldus Babacan. Volgens Armeense schattingen werden er tussen 1915 en 1917 in het Ottomaanse Rijk op stelselmatige wijze 1,5 miljoen Armeniërs vermoord, maar volgens Turkije is het dodental veel lager en kan er niet van opzettelijke volkerenmoord worden gesproken.

Turkije roept direct ambassadeur terug

Het lagerhuis van het Franse parlement heeft donderdag een wetsvoorstel aangenomen waarin het strafbaar is te ontkennen dat er begin twintigste eeuw een volkerenmoord is gepleegd op de Armeense inwoners van het Ottomaans Rijk. Hoewel de meerderheid van de 577 leden van de Assemblée nationale afwezig was tijdens de stemming, werd het wetsvoorstel aangenomen met 106 stemmen voor en 19 tegen.

Frans parlement erkentArmeense genocidePARIJS – Ondanks felle protesten van Turkije heeft het lagerhuis van het Franse parlement, de Nationale Vergadering, gisteren een wetsvoorstel aangenomen waarin Frankrijk de ”Armeense volkerenmoord van 1915” formeel erkent. Turkije kondigde direct aan dat het zijn ambassadeur uit Frankrijk terugtrekt.
„Ondanks al onze waarschuwingen heeft het Franse parlement vandaag een ernstige vergissing begaan tegenover de geschiedenis en de mensheid door de zogenoemde Armenië-resolutie goed te keuren”, zei de Turkse regeringswoordvoerder Rustu Kazim Yucelen na een kabinetszitting.
De Franse Senaat heeft hetzelfde wetsvoorstel al in november aangenomen.
De Turkse premier Bulent Ecevit ontbood woensdag de Franse ambassadeur Bernard Garcia om hem te waarschuwen dat de historische betrekkingen tussen Turkije en Frankrijk „blijvende schade” konden oplopen als het wetsvoorstel zou worden aangenomen. „Deze ontwikkeling kan een ernstige crisis teweegbrengen in de relatie tussen Frankrijk en Turkije”, aldus Ecevit.
GeschiedkundigenVolgens de Armeniërs werden 1,5 miljoen van hen tussen 1915 en 1923 vermoord in een campagne van de ottomaanse heersers om hen uit het oosten van Turkije te verdrijven. Turkije zegt dat het aantal van 1,5 miljoen sterk overdreven is. Het moderne Turkije werd na de instorting van het ottomaanse rijk in 1923 gesticht.
De Turkse regering meent dat er geen sprake was van volkerenmoord en wijst erop dat ook tienduizenden Turken zijn vermoord. „Beschuldigingen van zogenaamde genocide moeten worden overgelaten aan geschiedkundigen. Het beoordelen en gebruiken van een historische gebeurtenis voor de hedendaagse politiek zou een grote fout zijn”, meent premier Ecevit.
Frankrijk telt 300.000 Armeniërs en heeft daarmee een van de grootste Armeense gemeenschappen in Europa. De zaak was aangezwengeld door de burgemeester van Marseille, waar een grote Armeense gemeenschap woont.
Eerder hebben België, Argentinië en het Europese Parlement de Armeense volkerenmoord erkend. Het Amerikaanse Huis van Afgevaardigden legde vorig jaar november een soortgelijke resolutie terzijde nadat president Bill Clinton had gewaarschuwd dat dit ernstige schade zou berokkenen aan de betrekkingen met Turkije. De Turkse regering dreigde onder meer een eind te maken aan de patrouilles van Amerikaanse gevechtsvliegtuigen vanaf Turks grondgebied boven het noorden van Irak.

Premier: Bedreiding om genocide zorgelijkRedactie politiek

DEN HAAG - Premier Balkenende vindt het “zeer zorgwekkend” dat mensen in en buiten Turkije worden bedreigd of vervolgd als ze de Armeense genocide erkennen.Hij zei dat dinsdag in het debat over de staat van de Europese Unie tegen VVD-Kamerlid Van Baalen. Die vindt dat de Nederlandse regering van Turkije moet eisen dat (Nederlandse) Turken die zich uitspreken over de volkerenmoord vrijuit gaan. “Als dat niet gebeurt, zien wij de onderhandelingen met Turkije de komende tien, vijftien jaar somber in.”De minister-president zei tegen ChristenUnie-fractievoorzitter Rouvoet dat hij diens motie nog steeds uitvoert. Die motie uit december 2004 roept de regering op om in gesprekken met Turkije “voortdurend en nadrukkelijk de erkenning van de Armeense genocide aan de orde te stellen.” Turkije moet “eerlijk zijn over zijn verleden en daarmee in het reine komen”, stelde Balkenende.De toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije zijn een “schoolvoorbeeld” van hoe het niet moet, aldus SGP’er Van der Staaij. Zijn collega Rouvoet vroeg zich af hoe het mogelijk is dat het land de onderhandelingen met de EU steeds naar zijn hand kan zetten. De Kamer vindt dat de gesprekken moeten stoppen als Turkije geen Cypriotische schepen en vliegtuigen toelaat. Minister Bot van Buitenlandse Zaken zit ook op die lijn.De bewindsman zei dinsdag dat landen die lid willen worden van de EU, voortaan eerst aan alle criteria moeten voldoen. Pas daarna kan een datum worden geprikt voor daadwerkelijke toetreding. “Tijdstippen moeten niet centraal staan, maar kwaliteit en duurzaamheid”, aldus Bot. Op die manier houden burgers volgens hem vertrouwen in de uitbreiding van de EU.

Kürdistan sorunu, ulusal bir sorundur. Toprak sorunudur. Bagimsizlik sorunudur. „Kürt sorunu“ savunucularinin karsi ciktigi meselede budur. Onlar, Türk egemenlik sisteminin „Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle b?lünmez bütünlügünün“ resmi yaklasimin savunuculari olduklarindan, Kürdistan sorununu, toprak, bagimsizlik sorunu olmaktan cikarip bireysel haklar düzeyine indirgeyerek, bununda merkezi devlet düzeninde boy verecek demokrasi ile saglanacagi yaklasimlariyla Türk egemenlik sisteminin degirmenine ha bire „kardeslik“, „dostluk“ adina su tasimaktadirlar.

dinsdag, oktober 10, 2006

De rol van de Turkse lobby organisaties

Corrupte politiek importeert Turken probleem; Sommigen zitten met honderd touwtjes aan Ankara vast. Veel mensen willen niet geloven dat de Nederlandse politiek al beïnvloed werd door een land die in handen van tirannen is. De Kamerleden Fatma Koser Kaya (D66), Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA) en Fadime Örgü (VVD) hebben toen een interview gegeven dat het Turkse standpunt vertegenwoordigden; Nog steeds is de positie van Albayrak niet duidelijk. Het is wel merkwaardig dat Albayrak nu slachtoffergedrag vertoont!
Dankzij falend anti Nederlandse integratiebeleid van slechte politiek, de bemoeinissen van de landen van herkomst, zijn deze Moslims, zich door de jaren heen steeds meer als onderdeel van hun herkomstland gaan voelen en gedragen vormt een grote bedreiging, voornamelijk voor de kleine west- Europese landen die geen bevolkingsgroei hebben om te concurreren met konijnachtige fokwerk van de Moslims. Tijdens de laatste gemeenteraadsverkiezingen hebben we bijvoorbeeld gezien dat heleboel Moslims de ontevredenheid en slechte bestuurlijke factoren misbruikten en massaal hun nationalistische gedrag vertoonden. Ze zijn gekozen, wethouders geworden, maar ze doen alsof ze nog steeds in Turkije of Marokko leven!!! Het ziet ernaar uit dat ze ook voor de komende verkiezingen massaal hun stem zullen uitbrengen om de werking van de parlement te beïnvloeden.
Moslims hebben sinds 5 jaar meer moskeen gebouwd dan eerste 25 jaar, ze zijn massaal werklos maar in plaats van werk zoeken, zitten ze hier eigen deel vergroten, op die manier is tweedeling verder versterkt. Geen enkel weldenkend mens met verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel heeft hier baat bij. Zo wordt o.a. een voedingsbodem gecreëerd voor de Turkse Arabische landen, de lobby organisaties van diverse kleur en pluimage en Turkse nationalisten om deze migranten aan zich te binden en hen te mobiliseren rondom hun politieke doelen.
De diverse Turkse lobby organisaties die beweren dat ze "400 duizend Turken" in Nederland vertegenwoordigen zijn op hun beurt druk bezig middels diverse acties de zaak verder te laten escaleren. Hierbij worden ze gesteund door de Turkse regering. Via e-mail campagnes, discussiebijeenkomsten, onderlinge overleggen, dreigen met verkiezingsboycot e.d. trachten zij onder de onwetenden uit Turkije nationalistische gevoelens aan te wakkeren en vooroordelen jegens het Nederlandse volk te versterken. Van organisaties die beweren dat ze "400 duizend Turken" vertegenwoordigen, zou je juist een positieve verhouding verwachten. De houding van deze organisaties draagt helaas niet bij aan goede verstandhouding tussen verschillende bevolkingsgroepen.
Ook dat ze "400 duizend Turken" zouden vertegenwoordigen berust niet op de feiten. Naast deze organisaties zijn vele organisaties die een andere mening toegedaan zijn als het gaat om de Armeense kwestie en tal van andere maatschappelijke kwesties.
Bovendien worden 160 duizend Koerdische migranten ook gerekend tot de "400 duizend Turken". Vertegenwoordigen deze organisaties soms ook deze Koerdische migranten? Zo ja, wat is dan hun opvatting over de Koerdische kwestie en de erkenning van de Koerdische identiteit en hun democratische rechten waaronder het zelfbeschikkingsrecht? Natuurlijk zou het een illusie zijn om van dergelijke organisaties die het Turks nationalisme hoog in het vaandel hebben te verwachten dat ze zowel over de Armeense kwestie als ook over de Koerdische kwestie een genuanceerder standpunt zouden innemen. Het enige wat ze doen is het ontkennen van deze kwesties. Met ontkenningen lossen we het probleem echter niet op. Als deze organisaties werkelijk een bijdrage willen leveren aan de Armeense en Koerdische kwesties, dan moeten ze een open en eerlijk dialoog aan moeten gaan met hun achterban.
OKB heeft grote bedenkingen ten aanzien van de uitspraken die kandidaat en zittende -Kamerleden van Turkse komaf op dit moment doen, deze vertonen sterke gelijkenis met het officiële Turkse civiele / militaire staatspolitiek. De OKB vraagt van de Nederlandse partijen meer duidelijkheid over de precieze stellingname van tintallen kandidaten die in Nederland Turkse nationalisme willen uitbreiden, alvorens de kandidatenlijst van de PvdA, CDA, VVD, SP, Groenlinks wordt vastgesteld. Het is merkwaardig dat deze gemeenteraad en 2e kamerleden de drijvende kracht zijn achter de staatspolitiek van Turkije die hier de Koerdische volk bestrijdt en de rechten van de Koerden ontkent. Ankara gevoed hier niet alleen de Kemalistische nationalisten maar ook verschillende Moslim groeperingen; Milli Gorus, Hezbollah van Turkije zit hier wel in de "Turk Konseyi". Door de Turkije gesteunde Moslims en Nationalisten (overgrote deel onwetend en zonder werk die zich groeperen rondom moskeen) vormen een grote gevaar voor de integratie. Hun kinderen zijn nog agressiever geworden dan hun zelf. Het zijn dappere figuren maar ook moordenaars in spé. Het Turkse leger en zijn islamitische civiele verlenging, werken samen met de vijfde colonne hier, evenals rechts extremistische doodseskaders en maffiose terreurgroepen. Men spreekt over ca. 6000 organisaties in Nederland. Deze organisaties zijn hoofdzakelijk actief in de grote steden waar Turkse concentratie hoger is.
Infiltratie
Het infiltreren van bestaande partijen schijnt nog al eenvoudig te zijn: bijna alle Turken zijn in duizenden organisaties georganiseerd, gesteund officieel of niet officieel door de buitenlandse landen en organisaties. Geprovoceerde nationalisten en Moslims roepen een groep vrienden, kennissen en familieleden op om lid van een partij te worden, meestal hebben ze infrastructuur al klaar, Moslims hebben zich tot de detail georganiseerd. Je stelt jezelf kandidaat en grote kans dat je gekozen wordt. Dit is de tactiek van de extreem- rechtse MILLI GORUS, TFN, DIYANET en door de herkomstland gestuurde andere Turkse Islamitische anti- westerse bewegingen. Deze mensen willen hun eigen politieke doelen bereiken, niet de doelen van de partijen die ze steeds misbruiken. Over bekwaamheden of een eerlijk karakter hoef je niet te beschikken, daar wordt nauwelijks op gelet, vooral als je vrouw of zwart bent. Je achterban hoeft de Nederlandse taal ook niet machtig te zijn en niets te weten over de Nederlandse politiek. Van welke partij je lid wordt is niet zo belangrijk: dit wordt meestal door de MIT (Turkse geheime dienst) bepaald, alle partijen zijn immers bijna hetzelfde, weg is nog steeds vrij.
Turken hebben vanaf begin de Armeense en Koerdische genocide ontkend en vanaf de 20-er jaren het een staatsaangelegenheid om dit als niet gebeurd te beschouwen, Dit is heel belangrijk voor de huidige anti- westerse Turkse identiteit: het is namelijk zo dat deze Turkse identiteit die nu hier in Nederland verbreidt wordt is gebaseerd op de genocides van de christelijke volkeren van Anatolie. Het is dan ook heel erg moeilijk om mensen die generatie op generatie te horen hebben gekregen dat het Armeense Koerdische verhaal een leugen is, (daar bij ook nog genomen dat toen al helemaal het grootste gedeelte van de turken niet kon lezen en/of schrijven) het eigenlijk logisch is dat heel veel mensen daarin hardnekkig blijven geloven en degene die er niet in geloven zijn hun leven, carrière en toekomst niet zeker als zij dit uiten!
Het Turkse staat en onderwijs blijft de genocide ontkennen. Weet de bevolking dan niet wat er gebeurd is? Natuurlijk weten de Turken dat er veel Armeniërs waren en dat die er nu niet meer zijn. Voor de individuele Turk is het minder moeilijk om die feiten te erkennen: het is niet zijn verantwoordelijkheid. Ook historici en andere vooraanstaande Turken spreken nu over de genocide. Maar voor de staat is het minder evident om terug te komen op zijn ideologie. Er zijn veel Turken die zich die staatsideologie eigen gemaakt hebben. Zij maken het degenen die een open debat willen over de geschiedenis niet gemakkelijk. Wie zich uitspreekt, riskeert doodsbedreigingen. Maar deze kandidaten van Nederlandse partijen voeren bewust hun staatspolitiek, niet de politiek van Nederlandse partijen.
Turken zuiveren Anatolie: Het aantal Koerden en Armeniërs in de diaspora 5 keer zo groot is als het aantal inwoners van Koerdistan en Armenië. De Koerden en Suryoyo verkozen de buurlanden met name het huidige Armenië, Georgië, Syrië, Iran en Irak. De Grieken naar hun broeders in Griekenland en Cyprus te gaan. Met de massale etnische zuivering (ca 1 miljoen Grieks-orthodoxen werden uit huiudige Anatolie verwijderd) werd Turkije daardoor een vrijwel exclusief moslimland (zij het met niet-moslimse en moslimse minderheden). Zo de Klein-Aziatische Grieken: Byzantijnse rijksgebied, in het kader van de megalomane (I Megali Idéa) of "de Grote Idee" werden zij van de weeromstuit massaal verdreven uit een gebied dat gedurende meer dan drie millennia door Grieks- sprekenden bewoond was .
De officiële Turkse autoriteiten ontkennen nog altijd de genocide en beweren dat de slachtoffers zijn omgekomen omwille van een hongersnood... Turkije oefende tot voor kort bovendien ook druk uit op andere landen om het bestaan van de genocide te ontkennen, of in elk geval niet officieel te bevestigen.
Zo deed de Turkse premier Erdogan naar aanleiding van een bezoek van een groep Franse parlementairen de volgende uitspraak: "Ik had nooit gedacht dat vierhonderdduizend Armeniërs in Frankrijk erin zouden slagen een referendum te doen organiseren over het Turkse lidmaatschap van de EU." Deze uitlatingen hebben felle reacties uitgelokt onder de Armeniërs in de diaspora. De Franse minister van Armeense afkomst Patrick Devedjian reageerde: "Blijkbaar vindt Erdogan het erg dat de vierhonderdduizend Armeniërs in Frankrijk nog in leven zijn."
De twintigste eeuw maakte negentig jaar geleden kennis met de eerste genocide: ongeveer twee miljoen mensen van christelijke minderheidsgroepen – Assyriërs, Grieken en Armeniërs – werden het slachtoffer van hun islamitische buren nu ook in Nederland actief zijn. De toenmalige leiders van het Ottomaanse Rijk gaven op 24 april 1915 het startsein voor een slachting die de mensheid nog niet eerder had gekend. Onder leiding van de sultans zijn de Turken de christelijke minderheden toen te lijf gegaan met zwaarden, messen, dolken, knuppels en geweren. Andere christelijke 'ongelovigen' werden in putten en rivieren gedumpt. Assyriers noemen deze periode de 'sayfo', wat zwaard betekent. Armeniers vatten de genocide samen met de term 'aget', wat duidt op een 'daad van de vreemde die binnendringt en verwoest'. Zonder die slachting en de vlucht van nog eens miljoenen Assyriërs en Armeniërs zouden in het huidige Turkije nu volgens ruwe schattingen ruim 25 miljoen christenen leven. De nazaten van de gevluchte Assyriërs en Armeniërs kwamen eind april op straat in diverse steden, om van Turkije te eisen dat het de slachting van hun voorouders erkent.
Wat denken Nederlanders met zoveel Turkse kandidaten op hun lijsten die tegen Koerden, Armeniërs en Grieken zijn? Het is goed om de situatie in Koerdistan eerst nog eens duidelijk uiteen te zetten. De Koerden in Irak, Iran, Turkije en Syrië zijn daar een belangrijke minderheid; ze maken ca. een kwart van de totale bevolking uit, die een eigen historie heeft, een eigen cultuur en een eigen taal. Koerden zijn nooit Turks of Arabisch geweest en zullen nooit Turks of Arabisch zijn. Turken erkennen niet eens Koerdische identiteit zij noemen ons "bergturken" terwijl wij even verwant zijn met Turken als een Nederlander verwant is met een Chinees. Koerden zijn het enige volk van klein Azië dat niet verturkt is toen de Seljuks (afkomstig uit Centraal Azië) Klein Azië veroverden. Koerden behoren linguïstisch tot Iraanse volkeren. Kijk naar onze tradities het maakt niet of het een Turks of Russisch of Syrisch Koerd is, wij vieren allen Newroz het Zoroastrisch nieuw jaar, de vorige religie van Perzië.
Terwijl het Ottomaanse rijk in naam van de islam de minderheden onderdrukte, voert de kersverse Turkse republiek de repressie op tegen alle niet-Turken, onder de vlag van het nationalisme. Volgens de officiële Turkse geschiedschrijvers en ideologen zijn de Koerden 'Bergturken'. De slogan van Kemal Atatürk "Gelukkig is diegene die zegt:ik ben een Turk" wordt nog elke dag in alle Turkse scholen gescandeerd.
Jaren lang hebben de Koerden gevraagd om een vorm van autonomie zonder steun van Europese landen. Hun verzet, geleid door de allerlei organisaties nu toch weer in de bergen voortgezet. In een poging dit verzet te breken, verwoesten de legers van Turken en Arabieren nog honderden dorpen, het vee afslachten, de waterbronnen vergiftigen: dit proces is nog niet beeindigt.
Het Turkse leger heeft de VS en EU onder druk gezet met betrekking tot een op handen zijnde Koerdische staat in Irak. Op dit moment is de enige manier voor de Turkse machthebbers om de situatie onder controle te krijgen om zelf Noord-Irak binnen te vallen en de bezetting van Noord-Cyprus in stand houden. Als dat hun zou lukken, dan zullen zij dat land besturen gezamenlijk met andere dictatoriale Arabische en Perzische regimes.
De Koerden hebben daarenboven pech dat ze niet, zoals de Palestijnen, kunnen rekenen op de solidariteit van andere staten in de regio. Meer nog. De Koerden, waarvan het gros, behalve Turkije te vinden is in Iran, Irak en Syrië, zijn de speelbal van de regionale ambities van de staten waarbinnen ze vertoeven.
De Turkse invasies zijn jaarlijkse kost. Dit jaar is het Turkse leger al minstens vier keer Noord-Irak binnengevallen. Het Turkse leger jaagt in Noord-Irak op de Koerden, niet op iets anders.
In het noorden van Irak en zuiden van Turkije is een crisis van serieuze omvang aan het broeien die op korte termijn zou kunnen exploderen tot openlijk geweld. Sinds 1975 heeft de Turkse en Irakese regeringen honderdduizenden Koerden en Assyriërs (Suryani / Keldani en Arameeërs) gedwongen hun huizen te verlaten en in die huizen Turken en Arabieren gezet. Een tactiek die inmiddels bekend staat als de 'Turkisering / arabiseringcampagne'. Na het omverwerpen van de Irakese regering in april 2003 zijn grote groepen Koerden teruggekeerd naar hun oorspronkelijke huizen en landbouwgronden, maar in noord - Koerdistan (Turkse deel) niet. Etnische spanningen tussen de teruggekeerde Koerden en de Arabische kolonisten escaleren in ijltempo.
De Koerdische leiders zien een historische kans om de etnische zuivering die zich in het noorden van Irak en in het oosten en zuiden Turkije heeft afgespeeld een ommekeer te geven in toekomstperspectieven voor honderdduizenden ontheemde Koerden en andere minderheden. Bij hun eisen in de onderhandelingen met de Irakese interim-regering staan de rechten van de ontheemden hoog op hun prioriteitenlijst. Het zal moeilijk zijn om een rechtvaardig systeem te vinden dat de vele eigendomsconflicten kan oplossen. Dat is een schone taak voor de Eigendomsclaims Commissie die in januari 2004 is geïnstalleerd, maar die nog altijd niet echt werk heeft gemaakt van deze tikkende tijdbom.
Sinds de jaren dertig van de vorige eeuw hebben opeenvolgende Irakese regeringen geprobeerd om de etnische samenstelling van het noorden te veranderen door Koerden en Assyriërs eruit te smijten.
Turkisering /Arabisering
Op grote schaal begon de Arabisering in de jaren zeventig. In die periode werden minstens 250.000 Koerden en andere niet-Arabieren uit de noordelijke regio verdreven. Tegelijkertijd bracht de regering landloze Arabieren uit de nabijgelegen al-Jazira woestijn naar de Koerdische regio om de landbouwgronden te bewerken. De grondeigendomaktes van de Koerden werden ongeldig verklaard. De regering kreeg zelf zeggenschap over de Koerdische groep en verhuurde deze met jaarcontracten aan de Arabische boeren.
In Kirkoek kregen de Arabische kolonisten wel eigendomstitels van de grond die ze bezetten. Doel van de Arabisering was om regeringscontrole te krijgen over de olierijke en vruchtbare gronden in het noorden van Irak. De kwart miljoen verdreven Koerden kwamen vooral uit de grensgebieden met Iran en Turkije. Hun dorpen werden vernietigd om zo een cordon sanitaire te bouwen langs die gevoelige grenzen. Tienduizenden ontheemden vluchtten naar Iran. Velen van hen keerden terug nadat de Koerdische regio in 1991 autonoom werd maar konden onmogelijk weer in hun oude dorpen wonen als die in gebieden lagen die onder regeringscontrole waren. De overgrote meerderheid van de ontheemde Koerden kwam terecht in Koerdistan.
In Noord- Koerdistan hebben Turken 7 Koerdische steden gezuiverd van de Koerden: Malatya, Sivas, Tunceli, Erzincan, Erzurum, Elazig, Maras zijn bijna volledig geTurkiseerd. Bevolking van deze steden circa 80% woont nu ergens anders; EU landen noemen deze bevolkinggroep nog steeds "Turk" en laten de assimilatie ook hier in Nederland toch aan Turkije; ze bevinden zich weer in een andere val van de Turken: deze Koerden bv. In Nederland mogen niet door Nederland geassimileerd worden maar door de Turken. Nederlanders worden bestreden via hun eigen wetten, namelijk discriminatie. Turkse leger, dat via de Nationale Veiligheidsraad (MGK) achter de schermen de eigenlijke regering vormt in Turkije, blijft gevaarlijkste object voor hele Europa. De macht van het Turkse leger is immers grotendeels gegrondvest op het bestaan van een externe (of interne) vijand, onder andere west- Europese landen. De oorlog rechtvaardigt de immense militaire uitgaven en het op hoge toeren draaien van de militaire industrie waarbinnen de militairen lucratieve sleutelposten bezetten. MGK staat ook achter de moskeebouw, Turkisering en Islamisering binnen Nederlandse grenzen via zijn vaste voet Diyanet, duizenden legale en illegale instellingen en geheime dienst MIT.
Turkije en andere Arabische vijanden beschikken over een enorme militaire capaciteit aan de rand van immense oliegebieden. Het leger weegt bij deze landen zwaar op de politiek en kan daarvoor rekenen op de steun van de andere mogendheden die bang zijn van hun Turken Arabieren die binnen EU landen Islamisering uitvoeren!. Ankara, Teheran roepen beide het recht op zelfverdediging in ook al moeten daarvoor territoriale grenzen sneuvelen. En last but not least: telkens wordt de voorkeur gegeven aan een militaire aanpak van het conflict.
- De lidmaatschappij van Turkije.
Het Turkse leger heeft met westerse wapens lelijk huisgehouden in de Koerdische regio. Miljoenen Koerden werden uit hun huizen gedreven. Enkele duizenden dorpen verdwenen van de landkaart. Het geweld zorgde voor 40.000 slachtoffers, waaronder heel wat burgers. Nooit werd het Turkse leger en de contra-guerrilla een vingerbreed in de weg gelegd. Nooit vonden we de grote koppen op de voorpagina's van onze pers. De verantwoordelijken voor dit gruwelijk geweld lopen vrij rond, meer nog, krijgen de rode loper uitgerold bij hun bezoekjes in de EU.
Deze kandidaat-lidstaat is nog niet een democratische rechtsstaat; Turkije is formeel kandidaat-lid van de Europese club. Er loopt al een douane-unie akkoord. Dat zegt veel over de EU. Het kandidaat-lidmaatschap van de EU werd overeengekomen met een regime waarin extreem-rechts comfortabel zetelt en dat ongestraft een territorium van EU, Noord - Cyprus bezet houdt, De 'internationale gemeenschap' heeft al voor minder een strafexpeditie uitgevoerd.
Het Turkse staatsmodel lijkt meer op een militaire dictatuur dan op een democratie. Het zijn niet de politici maar de militairen die er de macht in handen hebben. Een analyse van het politieke besluitvormingsproces toont duidelijk aan dat de democratisch verkozen regering voor heel wat beslissingen afhankelijk blijft van de goedkeuring van de legertop. De militaire bevelhebbers geven de grenzen aan waarbinnen de politici kunnen ageren, en niet omgekeerd.
Voor het uitoefenen van haar macht maakt de legerleiding voornamelijk gebruik van de Milli Güvenlik Kurulu of Nationale Veiligheidsraad. De MGK bestaat uit tien leden en is paritair samengesteld uit militairen en politici. Onder haar leden tellen we de chef van de Generale Staf, de bevelhebbers van de landmacht, luchtmacht, marine en gendarmerie, de president, de premier en de ministers van Defensie, Buitenlandse Zaken en Binnenlandse Zaken. Officieel vormt het een adviserend orgaan, maar de beslissingen worden door de legerleiding wel degelijk als bindend beschouwd. Volgens artikel 118 van de grondwet is deze Veiligheidsraad bevoegd voor alles wat de 'integriteit en de ondeelbaarheid van het land en de vrede en veiligheid in de samenleving' betreft. In de praktijk wordt deze omschrijving zeer ruim geïnterpreteerd.
Onder druk van de Europese Unie werd de pariteit intussen opgeheven. De samenstelling van de MGK werd aangepast zodat de militairen voortaan een minderheid vormen. In de praktijk ressorteert deze hervorming net zoals vele andere Europees geïnspireerde pogingen echter weinig effect. Zolang de legerleiding de ministers in haar macht heeft, maakt de precieze samenstelling van de Veiligheidsraad natuurlijk weinig uit. De legertop beschikt ook over heel wat privileges. Zo hebben de generaals een grote invloed op het rechtssysteem en stellen ze éénzijdig het defensiebudget op. Officieel luidt het dat al deze politieke macht noodzakelijk is om de Turkse way of life te kunnen verdedigen. Politici zouden hier niet altijd even goed toe in staat zijn.
Het leger heeft via haar holdings ook een groot deel van de Turkse economie in handen. De OYAK-holding bestaat uit 30 ondernemingen, stelt zowat 30.000 mensen te werk en behaalde in 2000 een geconsolideerde jaarwinst van $ 550 miljoen. De zusteronderneming TSKGV is iets kleiner dan OYAK en is specifiek gericht op wapenproductie. Beide holdings genieten verregaande fiscale privileges, wat door andere bedrijven terecht als oneerlijke concurrentie wordt aangezien.
Gepensioneerde officieren krijgen vaak een bestuurszetel aangeboden in privé-ondernemingen. Zo is een hechte band met de huidige legerleiding verzekerd. Vermits er weinig tot geen democratische controle is op het defensiebudget, kan het 'Militair Industrieel Complex' ongehinderd zijn gang gaan. Turkije geeft bijgevolg een indrukwekkende 4,5% van zijn BBP uit aan landsverdediging, en dat zijn enkel de officiële cijfers. De militairen onderhouden bovendien nauwe banden met machtige industriëlen zoals Taskent en de families Koç en Sabanci. Het leger heeft dus zowel direct als indirect een sterke greep op de Turkse economie. Deze combinatie van politieke, militaire en economische macht maak de positie van de militairen vrijwel onaantastbaar.
De droom van een echt democratische seculiere staat leeft alleen in de hoofden van het politieke en militaire establishment in Ankara en bij Europese politici. Die politici hebben kennelijk geen boodschap aan schending van mensenrechten en vrijheid van godsdienst. Turkije zal in de loop van de onderhandelingen over toetreding tot de EU steeds beter aan de criteria voor lidmaatschap gaan voldoen, is de redenering. Martelingen en het met geweld neerslaan van demonstraties zullen verdwijnen en de genocide op de Armeniërs zal worden erkend.
En wie een openbaar debat wil of zich in de pers een eigen mening denkt te kunnen permitteren over kwesties als Cyprus, de Koerden, Armeniërs, de minderheden in het algemeen, het leger, de meer en meer vervloeiende grens tussen kerk en staat, moet heel goed op zijn tellen passen. De (inmiddels ingetrokken) strafklacht tegen Orhan Pamuk is slechts het topje van een kolossale ijsberg. Het aantal critici dat om minder is vervolgd, mishandeld of vermoord is waarschijnlijk veel groter dan het officieel bekende cijfer. Turkije werd het afgelopen jaar 290 keer door het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens veroordeeld wegens schending van de mensenrechten. Weet U onder welke gruwelijke omstandigheden leven Koerden.20 miljoen mensen worden niet erkend, ze mogen niet hun taal officiële studeren. Namen van Koerdische woonplaatsen al lang veranderd en Koerdistan geheel onder Turkse militaristische gezag en onderdrukking. Waarom geen enkele woord over onopgeloste Koerdische kwestie. Wij als OKB (Onafhankelijke Koerdische Beweging) /Nederlandse burgers teleurgesteld met uw domme standpunten die niks anders dan de verdere bezetting van Nederland door deze Arabische en Turkse verlenging veroorzaken.
Ondanks alle druk, wordt de mensenrechtensituatie nog steeds grotendeels bepaald door de veiligheidsdiensten, het leger en de politie. In Turkije kwam in 2005 het hele spectrum aan mensenrechtenschendingen nog steeds volop voor: marteling en mishandeling, buitengerechtelijke executies, beknotting van de vrijheid van meningsuiting, gevangenzetten van gewetensbezwaarden en 'verdwijningen'. Nog altijd staan talloze wetten het uitoefenen van fundamentele rechten in de weg. Functionarissen van de overheid nemen geen afdoende maatregelen om geweld tegen vrouwen, minderheden en niet Islamieten te voorkomen en te bestraffen. Ook het feit dat verschillende Europese landen elk jaar nog steeds asielaanvragen van Turkse staatsburgers erkennen, wijst er zonneklaar op dat Turkije nog ver is verwijderd van de geldende EU- standaarden. Zo bijvoorbeeld werden in Oostenrijk 19,11% van alle Turkse asielaanvragen erkend, wat een hoog percentage is.
Progressieve veerislamisering is het meest merkbaar op het politieke vlak, in de invloed op het Islamitische bewegingen en organisaties, de opkomst van de Islamitische opvoeding systeem en bepaalde elementen in de levensstijl. De Turkse overheid steunt duizenden moskeeën en rond de 90.000 imams, terwijl de Christelijke gelovige organisaties nog steeds geen donaties kunnen ontvangen in Turkije. Het gaat zelfs verder: bestaande kerken zijn veroordeeld door de staat, doormiddel van een wet dat het mogelijk maakt locale overheden de hoeveelheid nieuwe mensen dat zich aanmeld voor een Christelijke organisatie af te laten nemen. Deze organisaties zijn verplicht door de wet om de kerken te dragen. Zodra de bestaande leden zijn overleden, wordt de kerk automatisch staatseigendom. Sterker nog: plaatselijke overheden werken nieuwe Christelijke kerk bouw projecten tegen. Door deze constante onderdrukking en de groei van Moslims, de Christelijke populatie is verminderd van 28% tot 0,1% in de afgelopen eeuw. Turkije is een schijn democratie die door militairen en politie bijeengehouden wordt. Zoals in alle islamitische landen heeft men moeite fundamentalisten uit de regering te houden maar dat zal in de toekomst niet meer lukken. Als Turkije toegelaten wordt tot de EU krijgen meer dan 100 miljoen moslims het recht over onze normen en waarden mede te oordelen en zullen zij meer rechten willen voor moslims die hier reeds wonen. Wij voelen nu al beledigd door hoofddoeken en minaretten in ons land. Als Turkije bij de EU wil behoren moet de Koran zelf veranderd worden en de tegen ons gerichte 'jihad' verwijderd, alsmede de wrede straffen van de 'sharia'. Zoek eens naar de verwaarloosde en gevandaleerde restanten van het christendom in Turkije. Natuurlijk doet Turkije er alles aan om zich bij ons aan te passen. De islam probeert al eeuwenlang de deur naar Europa open te trappen de de huidige EU is dé kans om dat te verwezenlijken.
Turken en Arabieren als moslims naar Europa komen met "een haat tegen het Westen": dit is toch geen immigratie?
Wij kennen de "Heilige Maria" kerk niet in Turkije. Wat men wel weet is dat christenen daar achtergesteld worden, dat de Aya Sophia moskee in Istanboel (Constantinopel)ooit de Santa Maria Kathedraal was, dat in ieder geval in Capedocië de ogen van christelijke heiligen uitgeschraapt zijn. Turkije was dus ooit christelijk maar daar is nog weinig van te zien. Afghanistan was Buddhistisch, Indonesië was grotendeels Hindoe, Iran erkende Zoroaster als God - allemaal verdwenen door het imperialisme van de islam. Vraag het de Hindoes in India die forten bouwden (nog te zien) om islamitische legers tegen te houden, vraag het de Armeniërs, de Koerden, de Hongaren, de Serviërs. De islam geschiedenis is doordrenkt van het bloed van anders denkenden. Nu ben jij aan de beurt? Minister Donner en nog anderen willen nu ook ons uitleveren aan deze barbarij.
Degene die Turkije/de islam bij de EU willen betrekken zijn vergelijkbaar met collaborateurs die met de vijand heulen. Aan hen ook de verantwoordelijkheid dat er in de toekomst conflicten zullen ontstaan tussen de islam en Europeanen - zoals tussen moslims en anders-denkenden in vele andere landen. Kennen onze politici de geschiedenis niet van de Islam/het Christendom? Er is niets veranderd sinds Mohammed-de-Verschrikkelijke-Krijgsheer met zijn expansiedrift om de umah wereldwijd te verbreiden. Europa wil die Mohammed welwillig te zijn? Ze lijken welk getikt! Europa zit reeds met de gebakken peren van islam expansie tegen de wil in van de meeste Europeanen. Turkije heeft de Europese regelgeving (acquis communautaire) in eigen recht nog niet omgezet.Het optreden in de kwestie Cyprus toont aan dat die hoop ijdel is. In december 2004 werd overeengekomen dat Turkije voor het begin van de toetredingsonderhandelingen het douaneverdrag met alle EU-staten moest ondertekenen. Daarmee zou Turkije impliciet Cyprus erkennen. De Turken bezetten het noorden van Cyprus sinds 1974, Turkse leger met 38 000 man en tienduizenden paramilitaire Turkse grijze wolven roven de goederen van de Cyprioten onder de ogen van EU landen(terwijl Cyprus een deel van EU is) en nog steeds is er geen enkele Turkse soldaat weg uit Cyprus. Turken voerden sinds die tijd hun bekende demografische oorlog; Aantal Turken op de eiland steeg naar 350 000, terwijl ze niet meer dan 60 000 waren. Acceptatie van bezetting en deze demografische oorlog zal grote gevolgen hebben voor de west - Europese landen. Turken en Arabieren voeren namelijk hier ook een heftige demografische oorlog tegen de ongelovige westerlingen! Dit proces is juist niet anders dan het werk wat in Koerdistan en Cyprus gedaan wordt. Arabische liga en andere islamitische landen hebben grote belangen bij de EU- lidmaatschappij van Turkije, strategisch wordt dit beschouwt als de belangrijkste stap om in de toekomst meerderheid krijgen binnen EU landen.
Tegenwoordig leven ongeveer 6 miljoen Turken in de Europese Gemeenschap, in Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland in het bijzonder. Integratie van deze georganiseerde mensen is onmogelijk zolang Turkije zijn macht vertoont binnen EU landen, ze moeten voor altijd Turk blijven en voor de Turkisering van Europa werken, doelt TC. De bevolking van Turkije is gekenmerkt door een hoge bevolkingsgroei, wat leidt tot 92 miljoen inwoners binnen tien jaar, dat dan de bevolking van Duitsland overstegen zal hebben in die tijd. Dit probleem is helder, en is nog steeds onopgelost in de al bestaande leefgemeenschappen binnen Europa. Het rapport van de EU commissie voor uitbreiding, gepubliceerd in Oktober 2004, bevat referenties naar onderzoeken die schatten de potentiële migratie van Turkije op 13 miljoen mensen. Vanwege deze grote potentiële migratie van Turken, zal de toelating van Turkije tot de EU een groter ramp tot gevolg hebben in de toekomst. Hier in Nederland het percentage Anti- westerse Moslims neemt snel toe door de georganiseerde migratie hoofdzakelijk uit Turkije en Marokko, gesteund door 40 Islamitisch landen, onder de slogan: "trouwen, trouwen, trouwen" en "herenigen, herenigen, herenigen" totdat je daar de meerderheid krijgt", terwijl het aandeel autochtonen snel afneemt. Dit heeft twee belangrijke oorzaken. Ten eerste vluchten er meer autochtonen uit Nederland door de grote overlast, veroorzaakt door Moslims. Ten tweede hebben Moslims een veel groter geboorteoverschot door hun onnatuurlijke, asociale tactiek van herhaalde gezinsvorming met opeenvolgende buitenlandse partners, ten laste van onze sociale voorzieningen. Het voornaamste element van een lidmaatschappij tactiek van Turkije dus bestaat uit nieuwe type demografische strijd met de volgende elementen: migratie en de vorming van geïsoleerde Turken- moslimgemeenschappen binnen EU; Het huwen met meerdere vrouwen, waar toegestaan; gezinsvorming d.w.z. migratie van vrouwen, gezinshereniging d.w.z. vervolgmigratie van verwanten en het verwekken van veel kinderen. Hebben wij de invasie van Turkije op Cyprus vergeten? Of wat er gebeurde met 'etnische Albanezen'die in Servië gingen wonen daar waar ooit door moslims vermoorde monniken van die beroemde brug hingen, waar kerken en kloosters nog recentelijk in brand gestoken werden?
In Nederland wordt deze strijd op dit moment op straat en wijk niveau uitgevoerd, onder de naam Islamitische gemeenschaap, Turkse gemeenschaap, Marokkaanse gemeenschaap etc zijn er honderden duizenden mensen georganiseerd: deze mensen hebben geen enkele binding met de Nederlandse cultuur, leefwijze; met het huidige systeem hebben ze wel, maar dit is alleen voor de uitkering; ze doen alsof ze hun eigen staatje hebben binnen Nederland! Op deze manier willen ze hun nieuwe generaties buiten de landelijke sociale leven houden om een mogelijke assimilatie door de huidige meerderheid tegen te gaan, dit is nu hoofdzaak want als ze 3e en 4e generaties apart kunnen organiseren dan is de toekomstige bezetting van dit land wel gelukt, want reguliere Nederlandse bevolkingsgroei zakt heel snel naar beneden en over 15 jaar willen ze dat de ongelovige Hollanders hun gewoontes moeten accepteren niet andersom. Tjechzenië wil afscheiding omdat het op het zelfde manier als nu in Nederland een moslim land geworden is. Toen kwamen er moslims binnen, via geboortes en migratie hebben ze meerderheid gekregen. Libanon ook, Syrie, Kosovo, Bosnie allemaal via deze weg, Turkije precies hetzelfde. Wij hebben even veel recht, maar zeker ook de plicht, onze Westerse cultuur instaand te houden en te verdedigen door grootschalige infiltratie van de islam tegen te gaan, net zoals islamitische landen die onze Westerse cultuur afwijzen en 'islamitische normen en waarden' in eigen landen gehandhaafd willen zien. Stop met de illusie dat deze Turken en Arabieren hierheen voor de werk komen en voor altijd in minderheid zullen blijven!
De overheid zal een eind moeten maken aan het voornaamste wapen van de islam, migratie en gezinsvorming door ook islamitische landen te weren uit de Europese Gemeenschap. Daardoor zullen immers de allergrootste islamitische migratiestromen ooit naar het Westen ontstaan en wordt de Westerse samenleving en democratische rechtsorde voorgoed vernietigd.